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Abstract
This project investigates bilateral fishing agreements between the European Union
and developing states in order to assess the extent to which these agreements are as
successful at implementing international law principles as European Union officials have
claimed they are. Over the past two decades, European Union rhetoric has communicated
an intent to take on a normative power role in advancing human rights and sustainable
development approaches in the context of global fisheries policy. Officials have
propagated an image of a “new Europe,” conscientious of its colonizing heritage,
committed to promoting good maritime governance, and ensuring responsible fishing
worldwide as part of its global responsibility to sustainable development. These normative
principles have at times been framed as an integral part of the European Union’s legal and
political identity. In practice, however, the bilateral agreements have often come short of
European Union aspirations, facing criticism for hindering rather than aiding local
development. This project explores the bilateral agreements from an international law
perspective, engaging in grounded theory, discourse analysis, and a detailed case study on
European Union-Senegal fishing relations. For the European Union, the study raises
questions about conflicts between national and supranational fishing goals and about the
challenges these conflicts present to its goal of normative leadership. More generally, the
project suggests implications for enacting international law principles on the ground, as
well as for the inherent power dynamics of post-colonial relations fifty years on.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Problem Statement
This project investigates bilateral fishing agreements between the European Union
(EU) and developing countries in order to assess the extent to which these agreements are
as successful at implementing international law principles as EU officials have claimed
they are.1 Over the past two decades, rhetoric from the European Commission and the
Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE) has communicated
an intent for the EU to take on a leadership role in enacting human rights and sustainable
development approaches into global fisheries policy. Officials have propagated an image
of a “new Europe,” conscientious of its colonizing heritage, committed to promoting good
maritime governance and fishing practices worldwide as part of its global responsibility
for sustainable development. Indeed, these normative principles have at times been framed
as an integral part of the EU’s legal and political identity. In practice, however, the bilateral
agreements have often come short of EU aspirations, facing criticism for hindering rather
than aiding local development. This project investigates the challenges to the EU’s stated
purpose of normative leadership by examining the international law framework in which
the bilateral agreements exist and testing the alignment of the EU’s fishing goals and

1

A note on the European Union: For reasons of space, I have chosen to analyze the EU as a uniform actor
in the realm of international law and international relations. In reality, of course, the EU is a much
more complex entity. Increasingly centralized by many of its constitutional treaties (the most recent of
which, the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon, changed the EU's structure and empowered the European Parliament
significantly), the EU is nevertheless governed by an intricate interplay between member states,
represented by the Parliament and Council of Ministers, and the common interests defended by the
European Commission. Research careers and numerous PhDs have been made on the examination of
the EU's inner political dynamic, both in general and in fisheries policy. This, however, has not been
my purpose. Thus, although I do discuss in some depth the underlying dynamics of the EU as they
pertain to fisheries governance (in Chapter 3), for the most part I have simplified the interactions
between the EU's three bodies, choosing to focus on the Eurocratic perspective generally advanced by
the European Commission
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policy actions with this framework. To do so, the work engages in grounded theory,
discourse analysis, and a case study on EU-Senegalese fishing relations over the last three
decades. For the EU, the study raises questions about conflicts between national and
supranational fishing goals and about the challenges these conflicts present to its prospects
of normative influence. More generally, the project suggests implications for enacting
international law principles in fisheries governance, as well as for the inherent power
dynamics of post-colonial relations.
2. Research Questions
The guiding question for this study pertains to the EU’s agency and purported
leadership in global fisheries governance. There is a perceived incongruity between, on
one hand, the EU’s rhetorical claim of providing leadership in enacting human rights and
sustainable development principles in its bilateral agreements with developing countries,
and, on the other hand, the EU’s actual external fishing policy. This work tests this
observation with the following questions:
1. What is the overlap between the EU’s rhetoric of exerting normative influence
in international fisheries policy and its real potential for doing so? In particular:
a. What is the framework of international law in which the EU purports
to act?
b. Are the EU’s fishing goals and policy actions aligned with this
framework?
3. Background
The contemporary model for bilateral fishing agreements was introduced under the
terms of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982 (UNCLOS
2

III), which codified the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) into international law
and effectively placed 90 per cent of the world's fisheries under coastal jurisdiction.2 The
EEZ provisions in UNCLOS III addressed above all increasing concerns with pressures
on marine resources and improved understanding that these resources were not, in fact,
inexhaustible.3 Yet the EEZ regime also presented a balance between the interests of
coastal (often developing) states and distant water fishing fleets (often from developed
countries).4 This arrangement reflected a significant input from developing countries,
whose perspective played an important role in dethroning the previously dominant regime
of “freedom of the seas.”5 The significant sway of emerging states on the UNCLOS III
negotiations meant also that the rights and duties pertaining to the EEZ regime emphasized
fish in particular as an expression of developing countries’ interests in international ocean
law. 6 Over the following decades, this notion of natural resources as inseparable from
human and developmental rights became extremely influential in discourse on global
fisheries governance, in parallel to similar discussions on sustainable development in
international environmental law.
During the 2000s, these concepts found their way into the rhetoric of EU leaders
who sought to establish the EU as a normative power in international law. In 2000,
Romano Prodi ascended to his European Commission presidency for 2000-2005

L. Juda, “Basic trends in the evolving Law of the Sea and their implications for ocean use management,”
Oceanography 14 (2001): 17-21.
3
As famously claimed by Thomas Huxley in his Inaugural Address at the 1883 Fisheries Exhibition in
London.
4
L. Juda, “International environmental concern: Perspectives of and implications for developing states,”
in The Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order, David Orr and Marvin Soroos,
eds. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979).
5
Id.; H. Grotius, 1609, Mare Liberum; 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Article 2.
6
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part V, Articles 61.
2
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proclaiming that the EU – “the new Europe,” as he called it – “must aim to become a
global civil power at the service of sustainable global development.”7 His Environment
Commissioner, Margot Wallström, reaffirmed these statements two years later in the run
up for the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD): “EU
has to play the leading role in ensuring that Johannesburg delivers concrete progress
toward sustainability goals.”8 Similar rhetoric emerged from discussions on the external
dimension of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). As DG MARE prepared for the
upcoming reform of the policy in 2012, its Green Paper seemed to echo Prodi and
Wallström, outlining a vision for the near future in which “the EU continues its work to
promote good maritime governance and responsible fishing worldwide […] as part of the
EU's overall responsibility and effort to achieve better global governance of the seas.”9
The EU’s “worldwide effort” in promoting sustainable development and
responsible fisheries had faced severe criticism for decades. For the most part, reviewers
perceived the EU’s bilateral fishing agreements with developing countries as a form of
political and economic imperialism that exports overfishing and promotes power
imbalance instead of encouraging good governance.10 The agreements were lambasted as
unsustainable, exploitative, and, at best, “detached from the broader scope of European-

R. Prodi, “2000-2005: Shaping the New Europe” (speech, Strasbourg, 15 February 2000), available
online: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-00-41_en.htm>.
8
M. Wallström, "A wake-up call for global sustainability" (speech, Brussels, 26 February 2002), available
online: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-02-84_en.htm>.
9
European Commission, 2009. Green Paper on Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy. COM (2009)
163.
10
E.g., see N. Johnstone, “The economics of fisheries access agreements: Perspectives on the EU-Senegal
case.” Environmental Economics Programme Discussion Paper (1996); V. M. Kaczynski and D. L.
Fluharty, “European policies in West Africa: who benefits from fisheries agreements?” Marine Policy
26 (2002): 75-93.
7
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African development cooperation.”11
Calls for the EU’s “responsibility” in fishing came in part because of the EU’s
significant presence in global fishing governance. Considering the numbers alone, the
influence of the EU on global fisheries is tremendous. Collectively, the 28 member states
are the world's fifth biggest fish producer, responsible for a significant proportion of the
total global catch (see Table 1 below).12 The EU is also the world's largest single market
for fisheries products, with the highest total expenditure on purchasing fish products.13
For many developing countries, the EU is the principle market for fishing exports, and
therefore its policies in the area matter greatly.14

Total Catch of the World's Largest Producers
(volume in weight (tonnes) and percentage of total as of 2012)
0
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3,848,955
4.08%
3,466,945
3.68%
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Table 1: Leaders in world catch, 2012. Adapted from European Commission,
E. Witbooi, “The infusion of sustainability into bilateral fisheries agreements with developing countries:
The European Union example,” Marine Policy 32 (2008): 669-679.
12
European Commission. 2014. The European Union explained: Maritime affairs and fisheries. Available
online: <http://europa.eu/pol/pdf/flipbook/en/fisheries_en.pdf>.
13
Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, “Fishing outside the EU,” available online:
<http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/index_en.htm>; EUMOFA. 2014. "The EU fish
market," available online: <http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/market-observatory/>.
14
S. Ponte, J. Raakjær, L. Campling, “Swimming upstream: Market access for African fish exports in the
context of WTO and EU negotiations and regulation,” Developmental Policy Review 25 (2007): 113138.
11
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2014.15
In an attempt to remedy its image and role, the EU introduced the term “fishing
partnership agreements” (FPAs) during the 2002 CFP reform, offering coastal states a
dedicated sum for sectoral support in addition to the EEZ access fee mandated by
UNCLOS III.16 The language of “partnership” originated from the 2000 Cotonou
Agreement between the EU and the group of African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) countries,
which focused on partnership and mutual effort in alleviating poverty and supporting
development in ACP countries. The inclusion of this language was clearly intended as step
toward the “new Europe” image pursued by EU officials. Even so, the new reincarnation
of the bilateral fisheries agreements drew just as much criticism as its predecessor for its
prescriptive approach and for ultimately failing to support the needs of developing
countries effectively.17
These concerns continued to punctuate the debate as the EU began its 2012-2014
CFP reform cycle and renamed the agreements to “sustainable fishing partnership
agreements” (SFAs), once again evoking notions of responsibility, sustainability, and a
new beginning for its fishing relations with developing countries.18 Throughout past
manifestations of the agreements, critics predominantly highlighted the failures of EU
policy to address issues of sustainable development, human rights, and cooperation. These

Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, “Fishing outside the EU,” available online:
<http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/index_en.htm>.
16
Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, 2014, “Bilateral agreements with countries
outside the EU,” available online:
<http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/international/agreements/index_en.htm>.
17
F. Le Manach, M. Andriamahefazafy, S. Harper, A. Harris, G. Hosch, G.M. Lange, D. Zeller, and U.R.
Sumalia, “Who gets what? Developing a more equitable framework for EU fishing agreements,”
Marine Policy 38 (2012): 257-266; A. Gagern and J. van den Bergh, “A critical review of fishing
agreements with tropical developing countries,” Marine Policy 38 (2012): 375-386.
18
See Green Paper on Reform, n. 9 above.
15
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shortcomings proved particularly jarring in contrast to the high aspirations that official EU
rhetoric and policy language repeatedly communicated. This dissonance remains pertinent
today in light of the CFP reform’s recent conclusion, and serves as the main motivation
for the present project.
4. Study Outline
Chapter two explores the international law framework within which the EU places
its rhetorical claims of leadership. When official EU rhetoric and policy texts evoke the
agreements and treaties of international law, they draw on the rich history of ideas
contained in these documents. The EU’s aspirations must be understood within the context
of this framework. Hence, the chapter delves into the emergence of human rights and
sustainable development as guiding principles of global fisheries management. Using
grounded theory, the text constructs a notion of what normative influence actually means
in the context of this framework. The chapter demonstrates that the concept of EU
“leadership” is potentially problematic, as it appropriates ideas originally established
through the key influence of developing countries. However, the international law
framework does suggest a possible positive role for the EU: advancing the soft law
mechanisms through which these ideas have been promulgated in the past.
If the international law framework calls for good faith in implementing
international law principles, then the EU’s potential for exerting positive influence
depends on the alignment of its goals with concepts contained in this framework. Thus,
chapter three examines the EU’s external fishing objectives to determine if they are
aligned with this model. The chapter discusses the internal dynamics and structural
limitations that may affect the EU’s international involvement in fisheries. It highlights
7

contradictions between national and supranational priorities as detriments to the EU’s
stated objective.
Chapter four conducts a detailed case study on bilateral fishing relations between
the EU and Senegal. Senegal’s longevity of fishing relations with the EU makes it wellplaced to illustrate some of the issues involved in implementing international law
principles within the bilateral agreements. The chapter examines what environmental and
human rights or developmental notions exist in each iteration of the agreements and
assesses what policy actions might be necessary to carry out the EU’s rhetorical claims in
a way consistent with international law.
The final chapter provides conclusions and recommendations about the extent to
which the EU has implemented international law principles into its bilateral agreements.
Hence, this chapter will place the EU-developing countries relations into a broader
perspective by assessing the extent to which normative notions are employed, rhetorically
or in practice, in these agreements. Painting a wider picture in this way will help establish
a more realistic view of the EU's tangible influence. The work will draw conclusions about
future perspectives on the FPAs/SFAs and the kinds of insights they offer for international
relations, international environmental and ocean law, and the global regime for living
resource governance.
5. Methods
Because of its specificity and focus, this study employs qualitative methods of
analysis. It utilizes a combination thereof. Predominantly, it applies critical discourse
analysis methods to international policy and legal documents, speeches, and other sources

8

of recorded rhetoric.19 In other words, the work makes inquiry into the structure and usage
of language as a resource for understanding the underlying purpose and context of policy
documents. International legal and political documents – treaties, agreements, policy
communications, and law – employ language in a particularly purposeful way. This fact
allows the critical discourse analyst to study their use of phrases and terminology and
determine their political meaning, their conceptual origin, and their influence on
subsequent documents. Hence, this work analyzes purposeful linguistic connections
between documents in order to understand their real political impact.
Additionally, the study combines this critical discourse approach with elements of
grounded theory.20 The grounded theory approach allows for deep immersion in the
(textual) data without pre-conceived hypotheses and with the aim of constructing themes,
connections, and theories as part of the analysis.21 Here, this approach is utilized especially
in the second and third chapters. In the second chapter, critical discourse analysis of the
text of international legal documents suggests themes and ideas that, through the use of
grounded theory, are organized into a conceptual framework of human rights in fisheries
from international law. Later chapters then study specific policy documents or actions in
the context of this framework. Chapter three utilizes this framework, as well as the dual
approach from chapter two, to construct alternate hypotheses of the EU’s external fishing
goals as they relate to international law.
Finally, the study employs a case-oriented analysis (case study) of the EU-Senegal

19

J. P. Gee, An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: Theory and Method, 3 ed. (New York: Routeledge,
2011).
20
B. G. Glaser and A. L. Strauss, Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research. (New York:
Aldine de Gruyter, 1967).
21
Id.
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bilateral fishing agreement. The case study examines concrete policy and evidence from
journal literature in the context of the framework devised in chapter two. Simultaneously,
the case study tests the two alternate hypotheses devised in chapter three.
These methods are well-suited to this project as the unit of analysis consists of
documents constructed through intentional, structured use and choice of language. Hence
critical discourse analysis presents itself as the best tool to interrogate the communicative
choices made for these documents. The methods also afford the opportunity to study
processes that occur over a long period of time, something particularly important to this
project given its aim of examining long-term trends in fishing relations between the EU
and developing countries.22 Further, qualitative content analysis provides an opportunity
for multiple reassessments, resulting in high reliability.23 In general, methods used in this
study are applied widely in political science research, suggesting that scholars who work
with them generally find them reliable. Finally, methods are also unobtrusive and do not
raise the possibility of violating subjects' privacy.
Potential weaknesses of these methods include the difficulty in assessing the causal
relationship between identified trends and the danger of overlooking in-built biases
without triangulation with other data.24 Since policy documents, speeches, and other
sources of official rhetoric are usually written for a specific purpose, they could present
potential biases or distortions. Hence, to adjust for potential issues with internal validity,
this project triangulates between different sources of rhetoric and maintains an awareness

22

Id.
C. Robson. Content analysis of documents. Real World Research, 3 ed. (Cornwall: TJ International Ltd.,
2011), pp. 348-361.
24
Id.
23
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of the underlying purpose of all documents under consideration. The analysis also
compares findings to existing peer-reviewed literature in order to ensure the project's
internal validity.
Finally, external validity is ensured through the study's contribution to the broader
discussions of environmental justice and international ocean law. The development of
global fisheries governance has distinct overall trends and concerns. Expanding upon
these trends through a detailed examination of rhetoric in fisheries agreements would
therefore be broadly applicable across the field. But the study also raises questions about
EU involvement in international law in general – an ongoing discussion of what a
supranational organization’s role might be. The work touches upon the nature of
implementing principles and ambitious aspirations from the international level all the way
down to individual policy decisions. These are valuable themes – and ones that have wide
implications for international relations and public policy research.
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Chapter 2: Fishing It Right
Modern fishing agreements between the EU and developing countries draw on a
complex history of ideas that both sides have engaged with for decades. Thus, the EU’s
aspirations to leadership must be understood and evaluated within the conceptual
international law framework in which they exist. This chapter explores the theme of
natural resource use as an essential human and developmental right, demonstrating its
origin and inherent controversies. Although many of the notions pertaining to this theme
seem intuitive today, they emerged at the end of the 20th century largely through the
influence of developing countries, making the very notion of EU leadership problematic.
Instead, this chapter demonstrates that the EU can exert meaningful influence as a
perpetrator of the soft law mechanisms that continue to advance human rights and
sustainable development in the context of the fisheries governance today.
1. An Idea
When the EEZ regime emerged from the UNCLOS III negotiations, it defined
fisheries predominantly as a matter of national coastal state policy. This decision was
partly for purposes of conservation and partly an expression of the compromise between
coastal and distant water fishing states. Yet it also derived from a new notion that held
natural resources as vital to encouraging development and thereby upholding human
rights. At the time, this idea was almost revolutionary. It originated from the 1972 United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm (the Stockholm
Conference) – that is, shortly before the beginning of the UNCLOS III negotiations in
1973.
12

The Stockholm Conference first set in motion the principles referenced by EU
officials decades later. The conference’s conceptual influence on ecological discourse was
unprecedented. It came to dictate subsequent international environmental policy for two
reasons: because it defined the term “human environment” for the first time, and because
it chose to do so in terms of socioeconomic and cultural, as opposed to just physical and
biological, factors.1 And this expanded definition was due largely to a new understanding
of the environmental needs of developing countries, whose perspective proved both very
influential and very different from the concerns of industrialized states, which had
originally called for the conference.2
The opposing views of developed and developing countries punctuated
preparations for the Stockholm Conference as well as its proceedings. Whereas advanced
nations saw the ecological crisis in terms of environmental degradation and pollution
resulting from past mismanagement during industrial growth, for developing countries,
on the contrary, industrialization and resource exploitation presented a solution to poverty
and related environmental problems such as water quality, wildlife depletion, and
agricultural land degradation.3 On one side, a Northern environmentalist framed
ecological deterioration as “the consequence of indiscriminate deference to the ‘sovereign’
rights of nations – as interpreted by national governments.”4 On the other, a Brazilian
representative reacted vehemently to developed nations’ suggestion that “overpopulation”

L. Juda, “International environmental concern: Perspectives of and implications for developing states,”
in The Global Predicament: Ecological Perspectives on World Order, David Orr and Marvin Soroos,
eds. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979).
2
M. Strong, “One year after Stockholm,” Foreign Affairs 51 (1973): 690-707.
3
C. Joyner and N. Joyner, “Global eco-management and international organizations: the Stockholm
Conference and problems of cooperation,” Natural Resources Journal 14 (1974): 535-555; L. Juda,
1979, see n. 1 above.
4
L. Caldwell, In Defense of Earth: International Protection of the Biosphere, (1972): 145.
1
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in emerging states could present an environmental problem: “Plans for the Stockholm
Conference are marked by what might be called the ‘Calvinistic’ attitude that the
developed countries have demonstrated, by their development, a special right to salvation
and perpetuation, thus passing on to the more numerous underdeveloped people the
responsibility for creating the necessary space on earth.”5 Hence, the Stockholm
Conference revealed a contradiction between the need for multilateral cooperation, born
out of ecologically defined space, and the rights of development, hindered by prescriptive
policy.
In appeasing this conflict, the Stockholm negotiations circled in on a new idea:
that developmental and environmental interests met halfway where human rights took
central role. But this powerful perspective owed its existence largely to the overwhelming
majority of developing countries, who exerted a strong influence on redefining the notion
of human environment in terms of socioecological concerns.6 Because it occurred shortly
after a wave of decolonization, the Stockholm Conference marked one of the first
instances in which developing countries played a prominent and even determining role in
international governance. Their influence resulted not only in an expanded definition of
what constitutes human environment, but also in a completely new understanding of the
global scope of environmental issues.7 Never before had it been imaginable to center
international environmental management around the idea, voiced by Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi, that “poverty is the worst form of pollution.”8

M. Ozorio de Almeida, “The confrontation between problems of development and environment,”
International Conciliation 39 (1970): 54.
6
C. Joyner and N. Joyner, 1974, see n. 3 above.
7
M. Strong, 1973, see n. 2 above.
8
Cited in: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “Rio+20: from environment to sustainable
development,” (2012), available online:
5
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This idea gave rise to some of the most prominent concepts in modern
environmental law. Although the term “sustainable development” was most famously
defined fifteen years later in the 1987 Brundtland Report, the language of its definition
(“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs”) was a distinct heir of the very first principle
in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment: “[man] bears a solemn
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations.”9
As seen earlier, this idea found its way into the UNCLOS III negotiations and the resulting
EEZ regime. It gained further prominence during the 1992 United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio, revolutionizing perceptions of what
international environmental law must entail, and shaping the future direction of global
fisheries governance.10
This is the idea, then, that found its way into EU rhetoric in the 2000s. By then, it
had spread throughout numerous subsets of international law and produced a plethora of
new meanings and approaches across various disciplines, including, as we will see,
fisheries policy. However, at heart it was still the same core idea of human rights as central
to environmental concern. When the 2009 Green Paper on Reform stated that the main
objective in the new CFP’s external dimension must be “to extend the principles of
sustainable and responsible fisheries internationally,” it referenced precisely derivatives

<http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/newsletter/desanews/feature/2012/06/>.
World Commission on Environment and Development (Brundtland Commission), Our Common Future,
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10
P. Sand, “International environmental law after Rio,” European Journal of International Law 4 (1993):
377-389.
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of the original Stockholm Conference idea.11
It is vital to remember, however, that this idea had emerged mainly from the
perspective of developing countries. Moreover, it gained the prominence it holds today
through their early advocacy and sway. While subsequent iterations of the idea came to be
advertised by international institutions as well as a variety of developed and developing
countries, the latter continued to play a crucial role in the process. So impressive was their
influence, in fact, that a critic described the “semicircle syndrome” – the need to divide
round discussion tables at the 1992 Rio conference exactly by half to accommodate for
concerns with equity – as “symptomatic of contemporary multilateral negotiations.”12 And
in subsequent fora of the international environmental framework (e.g., the Johannesburg
World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002), emerging states' collective retained
a remarkable resilience of unity in defending the principles and supporting their further
development.13
Because the necessity of considering human rights in environmental policy might
not have emerged but for the advocacy of developing countries, modern EU language of
leadership in this area appears problematic. In the context of the bilateral fishing
agreements, to “extend” principles of sustainability would be to appropriate them from
the same group of states that first suggested them. A more successful model for normative
influence, by contrast, would engage more meaningfully with the concepts, emphasizing
rhetoric of cooperation and a goal of strengthening specific policy mechanisms in the

11

European Commission, Green Paper on Reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, 22. COM (2009) 163.
P. Sand, 1993, see n. 10 above.
13
A. Najam, “Developing countries and global environmental governance: from contestation to
participation to engagement,” International Environmental Agreements 5 (2005): 303-321.
12

16

realm of fisheries management. The following sections discuss what expression these
principles and tools take on.
2. The UNCED Model of Governance
While the Stockholm Conference introduced themes of resource exploitation as a
state’s sovereign developmental right and of environmental protection as indivisible from
human rights and development, it did so broadly. Later developments at the UNCED
mega-conferences in 1992, 2002, and 2012 expanded these notions with more detailed
definitions and specific policy recommendations. The Rio Declaration of 1992, in
particular, developed the understanding of the “human environment” to include
aspirations of alleviating poverty, providing equal rights to women, empowering
indigenous people, protecting people under oppression, and engaging youth.14 Subsequent
UNCED conferences, at Johannesburg in 2002 and Rio in 2012, built further upon these
concepts. At these later conferences, and especially in Johannesburg, the international
community also emphasized poverty eradication, health, and the sustainability of
consumption and production patterns.15
A brief aside is in order here. Following the direction set by Stockholm, UNCED
mega-conferences reflected global commitment to tackling a very challenging task: to
define the trajectory of lasting human relationship with the environment and devise
corresponding action plans.16 In doing so, the conferences continuously struggled, as they
14
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had at Stockholm, with resolving the conflicting perspectives of developed and developing
countries.17 As a result, the UNCED conferences ultimately promote a constructivist
model of global governance, one that derives its legitimacy from cooperation and
inclusivity.18 Noting this here helps illustrate just how problematic it is to ascribe
leadership to any one entity in this governance context –and particularly where doing so
concerns the EU, a group of developed states with a distinct history of non-inclusivity.
Instead, the very nature of the UNCED conferences and the issues discussed at them –
including fisheries – highlights the necessity to stress cooperation.
3. Human and Developmental Rights in Fisheries
It was through the UNCED conferences, as well, that ideas of human rights,
sustainable development and cooperation, found their expression in fisheries governance.
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 – a multi-chapter action plan developed at the 1992 Rio
Conference – focused on ocean law, introducing the principles of sustainable development
into the context of the legal ocean regime established by UNCLOS III. 19 The chapter
underlined several major themes for all marine fisheries, stressing as objectives
sustainable utilization and conservation, food security, and social, economic, and
developmental goals.20 In particular, Part D of Chapter 17 stressed the need to utilize
marine living resources for food and income, protect the interests of small-scale artisanal
fisheries, local and indigenous communities, and strive for international cooperation for
G. Seyfang, “Environmental mega-conferences—from Stockholm to Johannesburg and beyond,” Global
Environmental Change 13 (2003): 223-228.
18
P. M. Haas, “UN conferences and constructivist governance of the environment,” Global Governance 8
(2002): 73-91.
19
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20
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human resource development and capacity-building.21
Many of the concepts found in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 became deeply
imbedded into fisheries discourse, justifying scholars today in describing the introduction
of sustainable development to ocean governance as a “paradigm shift.”22 The resulting
commitments to introducing principles of sustainability to fisheries were operationalized
and structured through subsequent agreements, predominantly sponsored by the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the UN (FAO). The first of these, the 1995 Code of Conduct
for Responsible Fisheries, echoed both Stockholm and Rio with language that called for
“the maintenance of the quality, diversity and availability of fishery resources in quantities
sufficient for present and future generations in the context of food security, poverty
alleviation, and sustainable development.”23 Crucially, it also provided a detailed
definition of what “responsible fishing” – a term poignantly employed by the EU decades
later – actually entails.
The Code of Conduct expressed responsibility and sustainable development in
fisheries as a function of ecological, social and economic factors. In the text of the Code,
these factors are presented in a way that makes them indivisible: the utilization of fisheries
considers stock levels but also “food security”; conservation decisions are to be based “on
the best scientific evidence available, also taking into account traditional knowledge of
the resources.”24 Thus, while it is possible to distinguish the ecological from the socialeconomic concerns, the Code’s stature clearly aspires to make these factors meaningless
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without each other. Ecologically, sustainable fishing entails not only the maintenance of
stocks at renewable levels but also using the precautionary principle and considering local
biodiversity and ecosystems.25 Socially and economically, “responsibility” includes
supporting food security and poverty eradication.26 These are expressed through specific
goals that would become equally important to fisheries governance over the following
decades: maintaining the interests of small-scale fishing, aiding local capacity-building,
and ensuring fair trade that avoids negative consequences for “social, including
nutritional, impacts.”27
According to the Code of Conduct, therefore, “responsibility” and “sustainability”
in fishing involve consideration for the whole specter of relations between an environment
and the humans exploiting it. In other words, these terms and the approach inherent to
them must apply not only to the act of fishing itself but also to all negotiations, trade,
processing, and other activities surrounding it. Food security, for example, must be
advanced not only through sustainable stock levels but also through equitable market
decisions; poverty alleviation depends on building up local capacity for governance at the
same time as preserving the interests of small-scale fishermen.28 This wholeness of human
rights considerations in fisheries became the guiding aspiration behind subsequent global
policy efforts. Over the following decades, various initiatives of prominent international
organizations such as the FAO, the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United States Agency for
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International Development (USAID) repeatedly cited these ideas as did the EU.29 But
given the ambition of the aspirations set in the Code of Conduct, the framework of policy
tools for implementation continued to grow.
The most recent of these tools is the FAO’s Voluntary Guidelines for Securing
Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries in the Context of Food Security and Poverty
Eradication (SSF Guidelines), adopted in 2014. The SSF Guidelines bear a brief
discussion for several reasons: first, they were conceived to support the Code of Conduct’s
provisions and guiding principles, and hence show the latest expression of these ideas in
international fisheries governance.30 Second, the 2010-2013 development process for the
Guidelines coincided with the preparations and first stages of the EU’s CFP reform. Given
the EU’s rhetorical claims of leading the way in international fisheries governance, we
would expect to see the Guidelines’ principles reflected in the reformed CFP’s external
dimension.
The SSF Guidelines explicitly highlight the key role small-scale fisheries must
play in pursuing the Code of Conduct’s aspirations regarding food security, poverty
eradication, equitable and sustainable development through resource utilization.31 The
Guidelines speak of the vitality of artisanal fishing activities – pre-harvest through
processing – to local communities, serving as “an engine, generating multiplier effects in
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other sectors.”32 To this role, the SSF Guidelines juxtapose the considerable challenges
faced by small-scaled fisheries, stressing in particular the constraints placed on them by
industrial overfishing and, notably, by “unequal power relations” – that is, conflicts with
larger-scale fishing and other sectors.33
These points are particularly important for a study on the EU’s bilateral fishing
agreements. Challenges such as unfair competition and resource overexploitation have
been shown to punctuate the agreements themselves in the past.34 Further chapters, chapter
four in particular, will explore these accounts in more depth. But it is of note here that the
SSF Guidelines’ language emphasizes small-scale fishing communities as central to
concerns of human rights and equitable development in fisheries.35 Given especially the
simultaneous development of the SSF Guidelines and the latest reform of the CFP, we
would expect the EU’s policy to reflect these ideas if indeed its intentions of normative
influence are genuine.
4. Aspirations and Laws
Further, it is important to recognize that, even as influential and as ambitious as
these aspirations have become, in the context of international law and the EEZ regime
they have always been advanced through soft law mechanisms. Under the auspices of
formal international law, most implementation principles for sustainable development and
human rights in fisheries could be considered either as merely declaratory, or as entirely
32
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non-binding. The complexity of defining humanity’s relationship with the environment
had meant that neither the Stockholm Conference in 1972 nor the UNCED megaconferences in 1992, 2002, and 2012, resulted in conclusive codifications for a global
regime as UNCLOS III had.36 The non-binding nature of the UNCED conferences was a
function of their broad aim to build institutional capacity across borders and disciplines
through a continuous multilateral approach.37 The issues of applying human and
developmental rights in the context of environmental management were too nuanced,
perhaps, to be constrained by a hard law framework.
Or perhaps, in the context of sustainability in EEZ fisheries, the soft law approach
was an oversight. The part of Chapter 17 in Agenda 21 that dealt with fisheries on the high
seas or stocks ignoring EEZ boundaries did, by contrast, inspire the development of
binding legal instruments – such as the FAO’s 1993 Compliance Agreement and the 1995
UN Fish Stocks Agreement.38 For fisheries on the high seas, straddling and highly
migratory stocks, the chapter called for further international legal action under the
auspices of the UN and UNCLOS III.39 For stocks under national jurisdiction, on the other
hand, issues were framed entirely within the existing EEZ regime. Pertinent language in
the chapter demonstrates that the EEZ was perceived as a well-established legal tool, a
status that allowed it, in the international community's view, to lend itself to national
developmental interests: “Coastal States, particularly developing countries and States
whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of the marine living

36

P. Sand, 1993, see n. 10 above.
L. Andonova and M. Hoffman, “From Rio to Rio and beyond: Innovation in global environmental
governance,” Journal of Environment and Development 21 (2012): 57-61.
38
L. Juda, “Rio plus ten: The evolution of international marine fisheries governance,” Ocean Development
& International Law 33 (2002): 109-144.
39
Agenda 21, 17.49 (e).
37

23

resources of their exclusive economic zones, shall obtain the full social and economic
benefits from sustainable utilization of marine living resources within their exclusive
economic zones […].”40
As a result, most of the subsequent hard law – binding treaties and agreements
after Rio that expanded the formal international legal framework for fisheries – focused
on the weaker provisions for the high seas, straddling, and highly migratory stocks.41 In
this way, some of the advanced ideas of sustainability, most notably concerning integrated
and ecosystem-based management, became formally codified into fisheries governance
where it concerned fisheries outside the EEZ. Conversely, the introduction of human rights
and sustainable development principles inside the EEZ remained confined to the realm of
soft law developments.42 Both the FAO’s 1995 Code of Conduct and the much more recent
(2014) Guidelines for Small-Scale Fisheries are voluntary.
5. Conclusion
In short, an analysis of the international law framework for sustainable
development in fisheries suggests a challenging model for normative influence. Because
the concept of the environment as inseparable from human well-being originated from
the viewpoint and advocacy of developing countries, language of EU “leadership” raises
problematic questions about power relations and cooperation. Moreover, this rhetoric is
concerning given that the principles of sustainable development and human rights have
always been propagated at forums committed to multilateralism on equal terms. Hence,
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the EU could take on a normative influence role through support for the soft law
instruments advancing human rights in fisheries. The tools it must employ concern
small-scale fisheries (avoiding unfair competition), food security (through sustainable
stock levels and appropriate trade decisions), capacity-building (aiding local ability to
govern through cooperation, not prescription), and poverty alleviation (through smallscale fisheries and capacity-building). If the EU’s aspirations are genuine, and not
merely rhetoric, we would expect these concerns to be reflected in its overall goals, as
well as in its policy.
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Chapter 3: “The New Europe”
In chapter two, analysis of the international law framework suggests a very specific
approach through which an entity wishing to exert normative influence should implement
principles of human rights in fisheries: an approach based in cooperation for ensuring that
the health of both the environment and humans inhabiting it is equally upheld. The ACP
group’s vital role in negotiating the current environmental and fisheries management
regimes renders the idea of EU leadership problematic. As the UNCED conference series
have emphasized, sustainable development demands policy-making grounded in
inclusivity and cooperation. Simultaneously, the soft law nature of existing legal and
policy instruments makes good faith crucial in implementing the principles of responsible
fishing.
To meet its rhetorical commitments, then, the EU must inscribe its actions within
the boundaries of this framework. Its ability to do so depends on how aligned its actual
fishing goals and policy actions are with its stated aspirations. The EU’s stated goals,
consistent with a narrative of Europe as a normative power committed to the principles of
international law, often contradict its actual fishing goals, which are dictated by internal
conflicts of interests between member states. In short, the EU faces significant structural
limitations that impact its ability to align real goals with rhetorical commitments. This
theme presents the focus of this chapter. The discussion evaluates the structural limitations
of EU influence by outlining the evolution of the EU’s legal identity with regard to
international fisheries governance. At the same time, the chapter delineates the EU’s
external fishing goals over time, examining their alignment to the international law
framework.
26

1. The EU’s Evolving Fishing Identity
Today it seems almost intuitive that the fisheries, fleets, markets and other fishing
activities across the EU are managed collectively, albeit implemented by individual
member states.1 Centralized governance began as a legacy of the 1957 Treaty of Rome,
the founding document of the European Economic Community (EEC), the EU’s
predecessor. The Treaty’s original signatories (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) agreed to invest certain legal powers to the EEC,
including control over a common agricultural policy, which, in the specific language of
the Treaty, included fisheries.2 While it has been suggested that this addition of fisheries
was at first accidental, considering the relatively limited fishing activity of the original
member states, over time it proved by no means insignificant.3
The EEC came to consider its fishing goals much more attentively with the
accession of larger fishing states to the Community during the 1970s and 1980s (Denmark,
the UK, and Ireland in 1972, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986). Indeed,
the establishment of the first CFP in 1983 was prompted by pressure from these newer
member states and their fishing interests.4 Soon thereafter, the EEC’s centralized fishing
competences were codified through several treaties, including the Maastricht Treaty on
the European Union in 1992.
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The formalization of the EEC/EU’s collective fishing governance coincided with
the legal evolution of the EEC – previously seen simply as a common market organization
– into the distinctly political entity that the EU is today. This point is vital for
understanding the rhetoric of global leadership and responsibility that persists in CFP
debates today. The EU’s claims of normative power in fisheries derive from a vision of
the EU as champion of international values, a view that originated from the EU’s gradually
transforming legal identity during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Just as it had spurred discussions on fishing goals, the accession of newer member
states to the EEC also promoted the organization to reevaluate its political identity entirely.
In particular, the accessions of Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986) served an
international affairs agenda viewed by many as the origin of the EEC/EU as a political,
and not merely a market-based, union.5 The EEC's goal in admitting these three states was
not economic; instead it responded to the original aspirations of ensuring peace and
stability on the European continent that had resulted in the EEC's own founding. In fact,
both enlargements were heralded by overwhelming concerns with the devastating impacts
(as some critics presented them)6 admitting these states would have on the EEC’s thriving
economy.7
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Figure 1: H. Hairtzinger, “May 1979: Greece applies for admission in the EEC.”8
Various documents attest to the political significance in admitting these states as a
means of encouraging their democratic development, thereby ensuring stability on the
continent.9 In admitting the southern states, moreover, the EEC initiated a series of
institutional and legal reforms, which swiftly resulted in the Single European Act (SEA)
of 1986 (a first amendment to the Treaty of Rome), the 1992 Maastricht Treaty on the
European Union and ultimately all other reforms (the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the 2001
Nice Treaty, and the 2007 Lisbon Treaty) that led to the EU we have today.
Although fishing was only a sub-theme in these events, it was affected by them in a
large way. As noted above, the new states’ accession resulted in the firm establishment of
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the EEC/EU’s legal competence in fisheries. The Maastricht Treaty reinforced the EU's
control over the resource, whereas the EU’s ratification of UNCLOS III explicitly claimed
an exclusive right “to adopt the relevant rules and regulations (which are enforced by the
Member States) and, within its competence, to enter into external undertakings with third
States or competent international organizations.”10 Yet in exercising these competences,
the EU faced distinct limitations. Its approach to overcoming them gave rise to the rhetoric
on fisheries we encounter today.
2. Normative Power Europe
With the Maastricht Treaty, the EU had acquired a unique legal structure,
transforming into a type of supranational organization previously unknown in the postWestphalian era. It now faced, therefore, unique obstacles to establishing its international
legitimacy. Even as member states transferred certain sovereign competences to the EU,
as a supranational organization its degree of participation in any international institution
or treaty regime, including UNCLOS III, remained subject to the relevant provisions of
the institution or regime in question.11 Modes of engagement employed by traditional
nation states, by contrast, were often unavailable to the EU.12 Thus, the EU faced unique
challenges in international engagement although it carried a legal responsibility to
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represent its member states in many areas – as was the case with fisheries.
As a consequence, the EU strove to establish itself definitively as a legitimate
international actor in its areas of competence. The international norms that it came to
promote – human rights, democratic freedoms, the rule of law and multilateralism – were
all adopted in this way, with many of them coinciding with the founding legal principles
of the EU in the Maastricht Treaty: “the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law […]”13 Thus, it has been
argued, the normative approach adopted by the EU as a pinnacle of its international
engagement was directly necessitated by the EU’s legal origins. 14 Because the EU had
been established on the merit of certain principles and aspirations, its promotion of these
principles internationally was not only genuine, but also the chief source of its internal
and global legitimacy.15
Nor was this a view singularly promoted by the EU. On the contrary, a multitude of
external critics framed the EU’s international legitimacy as a function of its advocacy of
select principles.16 The UNCED conferences, in particular, saw non-governmental
organizations calling upon the EU to take on a leadership role in international
environmental governance.17 In the context of fisheries, analysts began measuring the
success of the bilateral agreements against criteria of multilateralism and development

13

Preamble to the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union. 1992. See n. 10 above.
I. Manners, “Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies
40 (2002): 235-238.
15
Id.
16
E.g., for a broad overview of the vast debate on the EU’s democratic legitimacy, see L. Siedentop,
Democracy in Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); A. Moravcsik, “In defence of the
‘democratic deficit’: Reassessing legitimacy in the European Union,” Journal of Common Market
Studies 40, 603-624.
17
S. Lightfoot and J. Burchell, “Green hope or greenwash? The actions of the European Union at the
World Summit on sustainable development,” Global Environmental Change 14 (2004): 337-344.
14

31

almost as soon as the first agreements were signed.18
For its own part, the EU has certainly promoted itself on the merit of norms. It is
precisely this approach to legitimacy that has dictated rhetoric surrounding the latest 2013
CFP reform. The external objectives for the new CFP, primarily driven by the European
Parliament, reflect the EU’s perception of itself as a normative power entity in general,
and a leader in environmental policy in particular: “The CFP reform aims to ensure
sustainable exploitation of marine living resources while working towards robust
economic performance, inclusive growth and enhanced cohesion in coastal regions. The
new orientations for the external dimension of the reformed CFP intend to project these
principles at the international level and contribute to more responsible international
fisheries governance […]”19
Relevant rhetoric has also promoted a distinct vision of the EU as an evolving
normative entity, thereby ascribing past misdemeanor to legal limitations. In this view,
early external objectives of the CFP were justified as the means to legitimacy adopted by
a mere market alliance of nation-states. Now, past external objectives, “such as
maintaining the presence of an EU fleet internationally and ensuring that this fleet supply
the EU market, [were] less relevant.”20 Indeed, these outdated goals were to be replaced
through a softer, more normative approach: “[t]he idea that the presence of EU vessels
worldwide supports EU legitimacy […] does not seem so obvious today: even in the
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absence of fishing interests, many international partners have demonstrated the ability to
influence global fisheries governance as well as an active presence in international fora.”21
The rhetoric also supplied the alternative: its vision of the EU, now empowered
through its enhanced legal competences, perceiving its role differently and pursuing
legitimacy through fair market principles and the promotion of multilateralism, the rule of
law and sustainable development. The New Europe’s goals were to be “good governance”
and coherence with international environmental and developmental policy.22 Talks on the
CFP during the latest reform frequently underlined external commitments by recurring
reference to international law and principles. In this way, documents and officials
continuously reaffirmed the notion that the CFP reflects broad EU objectives of leadership
in sustainability and multilateralism. The 2010-2014 Fisheries Commissioner Maria
Damanaki, in particular, often employed language that evoked these goals. Opening a
ministerial meeting with fishing partners from developing countries, for instance, she
claimed: “I value the external dimension of the EU’s common fisheries policy […] We
want to make sure that the fish stocks in all our seas are healthy and productive.23
Damanaki’s emphasis on the first person plural “we” and “all our seas” communicated a
strong sense of shared global responsibility. Further, it evoked notions of the “common
heritage of mankind,” a phrasing first introduced by developing states during the
negotiations for UNCLOS III but one reminiscent of the UNCED conferences and their
message of wedding sustainability to the promotion of human rights and equitable
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development.24 Evoking these ideas also related the EU as an entity ever more firmly
established on the merit of normative principles, and therefore one committed to their
promotion worldwide.
3. Exporting Overfishing
The normative vision contained in this rhetoric describes the EU’s structural
challenges as a thing of the past. The more founding treaties empowered the European
Commission, this narrative claims, the more firmly ideals of international law (democratic
freedoms, the rule of law, environmentalism, responsible fisheries) became ingrained in
the EU. However, this account overlooks the internal political intricacies of EU fishing.
Far from a uniform policy, the CFP vacillates between ongoing conflicts of interests within
the EU, resulting in external fishing goals that may not always align with the EU’s
rhetorical aspirations.
Contradictions in the EU’s external fishing goals were incorporated into the CFP
from its conception. At heart, the CFP represented a compromise between new and old
member states. Fishing played an important role throughout all of the early stages of EEC
enlargement.25 It proved an extremely sensitive issue during accession negotiations with
Norway in the 1970s because of the fishing industry's enormous economic significance to
the Scandinavian state.26 Disagreements over market and access arrangements figured
prominently among the reasons for Norway's ultimate refusal to join the EEC.27
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Similarly, fishing was one of the outstanding issues in the negotiations for Spain's
and Portugal's entry in the EEC.28 As with Norway, fishing constituted a vital part of the
Iberian states' economies; yet, large fishing member states of the EEC expressed strong
reservations against granting Spain and Portugal fleets access to their (already
overexploited) waters.29 Indeed, the accession negotiations with Spain and Portugal were
a main driver behind the original member states’ agreement to establish the CFP in 1983.30
The compromise that eventually lead to Spain and Portugal's successful accession three
years later, in 1986, involved financial aid packages for fleet capacity reduction,
(exasperated) calls for “political goodwill” from North Sea fishing member states,
suggestions for revisiting the CFP itself, and the underpinned importance of negotiating
fishing agreements with third state countries so as to “offer Spanish fishermen good
prospects for the future” – good prospects, that is, safely away from the North Sea.31
From the first, then, nationalist struggles, protectionism and local environmental and
economic interests figured heavily in the reasoning behind fishing abroad. Internal
conflicts between member states continued to influence future iterations of the CFP. Spain
and Portugal’s accession had set forth the EEC/EU’s quest of ensuring fleet access outside
European waters. Following UNCLOS III, the EEC had to negotiate such access with third
countries formally.32 Hence, the EEC/EU’s bilateral fishing agreements began as the
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unavoidable consequences of distinctly internal interests, coming into sharp contrast with
the high aspirations expressed by EU officials later on.
In 1994, Holden summarized the objectives of the first bilateral agreements under
the 1983 CFP:
1. To ensure that the majority of EEC fish supply is caught by EEC vessels,
not imported;
2. To secure foreign access for EEC vessels and thereby prevent them from
fishing Europe's already overexploited stocks;
3. To ensure a steady supply of species that do not occur in EEC waters; and,
4. To minimize unemployment in distant-water fisheries.33
Stated in this way, the objectives expose two distinct themes. The first, expressed
in points one and three above, focuses on value added for European fish supply and market
influence. The second theme, directly related to the political origins of the CFP, concerns
internal conflicts between EEC/EU member states and local economic and environmental
protectionism – in other words, goals of exporting the problem of fleet capacity and local
overfishing. These are goals that distinctly contradict international law aspirations such as
equitable cooperation or advancing development, building local governance capacity,
alleviating poverty, or maintaining food security.
3.1.The CFP’s External Dimension as a Value Generator for EU Fleets and Markets
Moreover, these are goals that remain pertinent. The bilateral agreements still hold
a considerable importance for the EU’s fishing imports, market, and fleet—something
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openly communicated by various EU documents not related to the CFP reform. At the
time preparations for the latest CFP reform began in 2009, roughly 40 per cent of total EU
catch was taken in third party states' waters.34 As of 2011, although the long distance fleet
constituted less than 1 per cent of the EU fleet by number of vessels, it accounted for 86
per cent of EU landings in weight per day at sea, 19 per cent of total gross tonnage, and
15 per cent of total income for the year.35 Given this immense value added, the continued
presence of EU fleets in foreign EEZs could not but remain an important consideration in
the CFP. Indeed, an interim report on the 2007-2013 period prepared for the European
Commission stated explicitly that “[t]he FPAs have made a significant contribution to
securing the continued existence and competitiveness of the EU's fisheries sector.”36
EU fishing competitiveness, in particular, has been enhanced significantly by the
bilateral agreements. This is consistent with critics’ speculations that the EU's aspirations
in international environmental law are dictated at least in part by regulatory competition
politics.37 Without preferential trade agreements in place, the EU's relatively stringent
environmental standards could curb its ability to compete with less conscientious
producers worldwide. In this context, the dual payment scheme introduced with the 2002
CFP reform could be perceived as a tool of preferential trade rather than, as advertised,
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one of sustainable development.38
Similar concerns could also be gleaned from the tariff regime incorporated in the
FPAs and now the SFAs. The EU-ACP system of tariff exemptions has been controversial
since its conception under the first Lomé Convention (1975) – framed as a tool for
equitable post-colonial cooperation by the EEC/EU but often censured by others for
promoting market dependency.39 The current export tariffs regime in the bilateral fishing
agreements draws on the successor of the Lomé Convention, the 2000 Cotonou
Agreement, which has faced similar criticism. It sets out tariffs-free exports from ACP
countries to the EU market as long as fish are caught by either the local fleet or EU
vessels.40 Given the limited size of large-scale ACP country fleets, this policy promotes
the host countries’ dependency on both the EU export market and on the EU long distance
fleets as the main (or only) means of accessing it.41 In this way, the FPA’s tariff regime
supports both the competitiveness of the EU’s distant water fishing fleet against other
global fleets and the EU’s position as the world's largest market and purchasing power for
seafood products.42
Finally, the competitiveness of the EU’s long range fleet has been supported
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through subsidies. These have included tax benefits, subsidized loans and grants for vessel
owners transferring their vessels to ACP countries’ waters, but the EU’s financial
contribution to ACP partners (as delineated by the FPAs) itself represents a form of
subsidy, mitigating vessel owners’ access costs.43 Depending on different definitions of
what constitutes a subsidy, the exact amounts granted to the EU fishing industry vary, but
they are always substantial. In 1997, for example, the EU disbursed 23 per cent of all
fishing subsidies among countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD);44 whereas a later report estimated the total amount of fishing
subsidies for the year of 2009 at EUR 3.3 billion.45 The subsidies raise concerns with
unfair competition as they make it economically viable for EU distant water vessels to
continue fishing when stock levels have decreased too much to justify the activity for
others.46
In short, the competitiveness of the EU’s seafood market and of its distant water
fleets remains an important goal for the CFP. Further, it is a goal that directly contradicts
the normative framework of international law to which EU rhetoric purportedly aspires.
The subsidized operational flexibility of EU vessels places pressure on small-scale
fishermen who do not have similar support. The resulting “unequal power relations”
feature as a main concern in the FAO’s SSF Guidelines.47 Meanwhile, the tariffs regime
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increases ACP governments’ dependency on the EU export market and the bilateral
agreements as a way to access it, undermining developmental goals and coming into sharp
contrast with the FAO Code of Conduct’s provisions on equitable trade of fish and seafood
products that does not “result in obstacles to trade, environmental degradation or negative
social, including nutritional, impacts.”48 And finally, the value added by EU operations in
ACP waters belies claims from the European Commission that the agreements are no
longer as pivotal as before.49
3.2.The CFP’s External Dimension as a Solution to Internal Politics
Equally, the role of the CFP as a means of assuaging problems and internal
conflicts within the EU remains active. As noted above, the bilateral agreements
originated as a means of allocating capacity (especially Spanish vessels) outside of
European waters (especially the North Sea). This concern with relocating excess capacity
has not receded. The 2009 Green Paper on Reform attributed the CFP’s overall (internal)
poor performance, the continuously declining fish stocks (in European waters) and the
low profitability of European fisheries to “chronic overcapacity.”50 In addressing the issue,
the EU has employed a range of subsidies that encouraged vessel owners to relocate to
ACP countries’ waters. 51 It has done so predominantly through offering grants for joint
ventures with ACP partners and increased access through the bilateral agreements. In
2000, for instance, 16 out of 31 Spanish vessels relocated to the Senegalese register
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received structural fund subsidies from the EU.52
The internal EU politics of distant water fishing remain a substantial factor in this
dynamic. Early on, the sway of Spain, Italy and France (three large fishing member states)
resulted in the exclusion of fisheries from the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 1995
Agreement on Agriculture because the treaty sought to limit sectoral subsidies, whereas
all three countries benefited from EU subsidies in fisheries.53 Spain, in particular, has been
a consistent recipient of subsidiary benefits, accounting for 26 per cent of EFF funding in
the 2007-2013 period (followed by Portugal at 17 per cent and Italy at just under 10).54
The politics involved in keeping Spanish (and Portuguese) fleets away from European
waters while maintaining their economic gains continue to impact the CFP. Spain’s
influence on the EU’s external fisheries policy is substantiated by the country’s
overwhelming share in total capacity (22 per cent of gross tonnage as of 2014) and in total
employment (a quarter of all EU jobs in the fisheries sector as of 2014).55
Hence the bilateral agreements are still an important utility in furthering EU fishing
interests and mitigating internal conflicts. Goals such as redistributing excess fleet
capacity through ensuring continuing access to third states' waters and retaining market
status quo are still discernible in the FPAs/SFAs today. These goals plainly contrast the
Green Paper on Reform's statement that “the logic of the EU external fleet supplying the
EU market is being undermined by our large and increasing dependence on imports.”56
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On the contrary, the EU’s fishing goals seem dictated above all by the continuing
importance of external fishing as a solution to internal interests.
4. Conclusion
The analysis of the EU’s actual fishing goals presents an obvious contradiction
with the EU’s stated aspirations. Whereas official rhetoric on the CFP’s external
dimension presents a vision of normative responsibility enabled by legal centralization,
the analysis reveals that structural limitations still persist, spurred by internal interests and
conflicts. The following chapter examines a case study on the EU’s fishing relations with
Senegal so as to offer some more concrete evidence of the mismatch and, in the final
chapter, present pertinent policy recommendations.
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Chapter 4: Senegal Fisheries and the EU Agreements
While in chapter two the international law framework suggested a very specific
model for normative influence in fisheries governance, the conflicting goals of external
EU fishing illustrated in chapter three place doubt on the EU’s ability and even its desire
to take on that role successfully. This chapter examines a case study of fishing relations
between the EU and Senegal in the 1979-2014 period. The chapter explores different
iterations of the two parties’ bilateral agreements over time. In doing so, the chapter
assesses whether the actual policy has reflected rhetorical aspirations from the EU’s
normative power perspective. More specifically, the chapter compares the agreements’
textual and political history to the international law framework for sustainable and
responsible fisheries: considerations for maintaining food security, efforts toward poverty
eradication, promoting equitable development, and protecting small-scale fisheries.
1. Fishing in Senegal
For a number of reasons, Senegal presents itself as a useful case study of the extent
to which the EU’s bilateral fishing agreements can successfully introduce concepts of
sustainability and human rights in practice. Senegal exemplifies many trends that are
generally applicable to the issues of long-distance fishing and EU-ACP fishing relations.
To begin, the country is a former French colony, hence its relationship with the EU today
reflects all the post-colonial moral complexities of trade and resource exploitation that
could generally be attributed to the FPA/SFAs.1
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Due to significant upwelling along its coast as part of the Canary Current and Gulf
of Guinea Large Marine Ecosystems, Senegal’s EEZ contains particularly rich fishery
resources that have been heavily targeted by distant water fleets from Europe and
elsewhere over the last three decades.2

Figure 2: Senegal's EEZ.
Like other rich-resource coastal states targeted by foreign fleets, Senegal has faced
problems with over-capacity and over-exploitation.3 In the three decades between 1970
and 2000, landings from the country’s EEZ increased nearly six-fold, from 60,000 to
350,000 tonnes.4 This has led to a rapid decline of fishing stocks, particularly ones at the
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high trophic level, including tuna, deep sea demersal fish, and cephalopods (the species
predominantly targeted by foreign fleets in Senegal, including the EU). 5 These issues,
representative of many developing states in the region, are also exacerbated by the poor
quality and quantity of statistical information supporting the industry today. Small scale
and industrial fisheries’ catches in West African countries are often monitored separately,
by systems that are managed by different organizations and use distinct methods from one
another.6 Different levels of funding and resources also mean that the resulting data are
rarely equally comprehensive.7 In Senegal, issues with competing information sources and
methodologies have at times been observed even within the same fishery. 8 Hence,
although the first datasets of Senegalese fisheries dates as far back as the 1950s,
comparative analyses of stock levels and fishing effort remain difficult because of the
continuity and complementarity issues of later data.9
Senegal also presents a perfect case study for this project because of its
involvement with the EU and the CFP. Following its decolonization, Senegal became the
first country in Africa to enter into a bilateral fishing agreement with the EEC/EU in
1979.10 Since then, Senegal and the EU have maintained an evolving fishing relationship.
In exchange for financial compensation, in Senegalese waters the EU has targeted
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predominantly tuna, but also shrimp and demersal species such as hake and cephalopods.
The two parties have explored multiple iterations of the bilateral agreements: from the
original agreement to a number of subsequent amendments, a 2002-2006 protocol
incorporating certain notions from the 2002 CFP reform, a 2006-2014 hiatus, and finally
the most recent agreement signed in October of 2014, marking the EU’s first SFA after the
latest reform of the CFP.11 In other words, Senegal’s fishing agreements with the EU not
only represent the longest duration of post-colonial fishing relations, but also afford the
opportunity to compare each stage of these relations and trace the way in which relevant
policy has affected the industry and the country over time.
And crucially, Senegal constitutes an important case study for the evolution of EUACP fishing relations because the human rights and sustainable development aspects of
the FPA/SFAs for the country are quite significant. Fishing is as an important pillar of the
Senegalese economy, prompting UN reports to deem it vital for the country’s sustainable
growth.12 The fishing industry employs 15 per cent of Senegal’s workers, while 75 per
cent of Senegal’s population relies on fish products as a main source of protein – the
second highest fish consumption per capita in Africa.13 At the same time, fishing has
served as Senegal’s largest export for nearly three decades. 14 Finally, the interests of
artisanal or subsistence fishing are particularly important to the country. In 2002, 90 per
cent of its 100,000 fishermen were considered to be small-scale fishermen.15 This trend is
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representative of the region as a whole, where over 90 per cent of fishing vessels are less
than 12 meters long.16 It also makes the FAO’s SSF Guidelines, and the EU’s stated role
in enforcing them through its new agreements, particularly important for Senegal.
In short, Senegal affords ample opportunity to study the merit of the EU’s claims
in practice, both during the previous and current iterations of the CFP and the FPA/SFAs.
Because the country is representative of many issues shared across the region, studying
Senegal’s fishing relations with the EU could lead to generalizable conclusions for the
bilateral agreements as a whole. This chapter will compare the different agreements to
each other, evaluating the extent to which they demonstrate progress in reflecting the
international human rights and environmental law principles discussed in the previous
chapters. This evaluation will be based both on rhetorical and, as much as possible, on
practical evidence from Senegal.
2. Criteria for Analysis
The analysis of the international law framework in chapter two demonstrated that
the ideas and principles associated with sustainable development lie on the merit of
cooperation, multilateralism, and enabling developing states’ self-governing capacities. In
fisheries, these goals are expressed in the promotion of a set of soft law principles
delineated by the FAO’s 1995 Code of Conduct and 2014 SSF Guidelines.
Rhetoric from the EU has claimed that the EU’s progressive legal structure has
placed it in a position where it not only can but also must promote these soft law principles.
As we have seen in chapter three, however, internal interests persist among the CFP’s
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external goals, placing structural limitations to the EU’s ability to support its claims in
practice.
The criteria for analysis of this case study flow from these findings. If the EU’s
normative perspective holds, then evidence from the sequence of bilateral agreements
would show a progressive implementation of responsible fishing principles, concurrent
with the evolution of the EU’s legal centralization. Hence, EU-Senegal protocols and
agreements following 1995 would increasingly implement policies aimed at poverty
eradication, capacity building, food security, and the well-being of small-scale fishing
communities. Under this normative influence hypothesis, the latest EU-Senegal
agreement (signed in October 2014) would implement advanced ideas for policies targeted
at artisanal fisheries from the negotiations of the FAO’s SSF Guidelines.
Alternatively, if the sequential agreements reveal an ongoing impact of the EU’s
internal interests, including capacity relocation, concern with vessel or market
competitiveness, and EU (rather than local fishers’) job security. Finding such evidence
would suggest that structural limitations to the EU’s normative involvement in fisheries
are still substantial.
3. An Agreement Evolution
3.1.The 1979 Agreement
The earliest agreement between the EEC and Senegal, signed in 1979, addresses
predominantly concerns of trade: access to resources in return for corresponding
payments.17 Aspirations such as conservation or sustainability are barely represented in
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this earliest version. However, this closely reflects the agreement’s international law
context, particularly in its limited inclusion of aspects such as developmental rights,
equitable resource usage and intergenerational sustainability.
Although it refers to the then-ongoing UNCLOS III proceedings in its preamble,
the 1979 EEC-Senegal agreement precedes both the Convention’s conclusion in 1982 and
important subsequent developments in fisheries governance, such as the 1995 Fish Stocks
Agreement. Given its context, and especially the political priorities of the European
Commission at the time the CFP was first negotiated in 1983, it is hardly surprising that
the agreement shows little textual evidence of concern with stock levels. A single article
commits both parties to “concert action… to ensure the management and conservation of
the living resources.”18 There are, however, no provisions for desired stock availability;
further, the agreement or its protocol do not assign catch quotas to individual EEC license
holders.19 Similarly, some of the agreement’s articles contradict notions that are now vital
for modern fisheries management. For instance, the agreement’s postulation that any
conservation measures reducing the EEC’s assigned opportunities “shall be offset by other
fishing opportunities of equal value…” would prove difficult today given improved
understanding of fishing ecosystems and impacts on different trophic levels.20 Yet this
provision corresponds directly to the EEC’s external fishing priorities at the time – that is,
maintaining independent fish supply and employment for fishermen.21
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Similarly, the agreement reflects only very early notions of developing countries’
needs, regarding fishing simply as a tradable commodity and thereby a revenue source.
Signed only shortly after the 1972 Stockholm Conference and far in advance of the 1992
Earth Summit in Rio, where fisheries first became firmly associated with sustainability or
development,22 the agreement comes short of meaningful considerations for the local
industry, food security, or Senegal’s development. While it does contain statements about
“mutual trust and respect for each other’s interests in the sphere of sea fishing,” the
agreement is at core simply an exchange of license payments for catch opportunity. 23
The preamble also makes reference to the “spirit of cooperation resulting from the
Lomé Convention.”24 The first Lomé Convention, signed in 1975, set forth principles of
cooperation between the EEC and ACP countries aiming to direct the two sides’ political
and trade relations following decolonization.25 As part of its provisions, the Lomé
Convention introduced non-reciprocal duty exemptions on a wide array of products
originating from ACP countries, encouraging ACP exports to the EEC and introducing
protections for these exports against shortfall due to price or supply fluctuations.26 In this
way, the Lomé Convention helped expand Senegalese fish exports significantly – quickly
transforming fish into the country’s main export – yet it came into criticism later for
creating a worrying market dependency on the EEC/EU in the process. 27 In addition, the
resulting expansion of export-oriented fishing over the following decades shifted the
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Senegalese industry’s efforts away from domestic supply, causing concern with protein
deficit and creating conflicts with the artisanal fleet over resource access later on.28 It was
not until the third Lomé Convention, signed in 1984, that the focus of ACP-EEC relations
shifted away from industrial development and trade preferences, and instead focused on
self-reliant development, based in food security and self-sufficiency.29
Set in this historical context, the 1979 bilateral fishing agreement reflects relevant
issues with the power imbalance of post-colonial relations. The agreement postulates fish
as a trading commodity, without due regard to problems with its renewability or its local
value. Additionally, its impacts reflect issues that would become apparent in the global
fisheries governance regime as it was settled in UNCLOS III. One of the emergent
problems, for instance, was rooted in the complementarity principle. UNCLOS III
postulated that foreign fleets should only conclude access agreements with the coastal
state in the event of a stock “surplus” not exploited by local fleets: that is, only if efforts
by local and foreign fleets were complementary to each other within a common target
effort frame.30 In the Senegalese case, government revenue from bilateral agreements
proved important enough to justify renewing access agreements despite the fact that
Senegal’s growing small-scale national fleet soon became capable of exploiting Senegal’s
stocks fully.31 As the size of the artisanal fleet increased and became increasingly
motorized, the complementarity principle caused competition between industrial and
small-scale fishermen, predominantly to the detriment of the latter.32 Further, the issue of
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determining complementary efforts correctly was exacerbated by problems with scientific
assessments of stocks, which were often based on incomplete landing reports and just as
often disregarded during the process of concluding the agreements.33 And finally, the
principle has raised issues of power and prescription, especially in the context of EU/EECACP relations, as political negotiations between the two sides often involve an a priori
assumption that stock surplus is invariably available in ACP countries.34
In short, the 1979 EEC-Senegal agreement reflected the shortcomings of the
international law context it cited. Unsurprisingly, it soon came under criticism for its
failure to set up conservation measures such as clear catch quotas for licensed vessels, as
well as for the lack of compliance of its foreign fleets and for inadvertently promoting
ineffectual resource governance.35 It might equally be stated, however, that the agreement
came into review because it had lost its coherence with the broader framework of
international law and the gradual infusion of developmental and sustainability concerns
into fisheries governance.
3.2.Letters and Protocols, 1979-2002
The original 1979 agreement was amended twice and its duration extended
numerous times by a series of subsequent protocols and letter exchanges; but the original
conditions of the agreement itself were never actually renegotiated in their entirety during
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the 1979-2006 period. Accordingly, the agreement and its impacts on the local industry
faced intensifying criticism as sustainable development, small-scale fishing rights, and
ecosystem-based management became more integral to the international model for
fisheries management during the 1990s and early 2000s.36
Different reports emphasized various aspects of the agreement’s power imbalance,
lack of sustainability, and disregard for Senegal’s interests. As early as 1996, a Transparent
Sea report discussed the weakness of Senegal’s bargaining position in EEC-Senegal
fishing negotiations because the target species’ mobility across Western African EEZs
enabled the EEC/EU to access the resource elsewhere by concluding agreements with
neighboring countries.37 Multiple reports stressed the negative impacts of the EEC/EU’s
fleets on local resources and Senegal as a whole. Analysis of the EEC-ACP fishing
agreements over the duration of the 1990s showed that revenue from the EEC’s financial
contribution was only marginally beneficial to the coastal state, with most of the added
value from the exchange collected by EEC/EU vessel operators (mostly from Spain).38
During the same decade, Senegal’s increasing market dependency on the EEC/EU and its
Lomé-driven shift toward export-oriented fishing at the expense of national markets’
needs was exacerbated.39 As a result, critics expressed concern with local food security,
employment, and especially with the interests of the artisanal fleet.40 EEC subsidies made
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the distant water fishing fleet even more competitive with the local small-scale fishermen
as it could afford to continue operations even when the stock levels were too low to make
the expense justifiable without subsidies.41
On par with developmental concerns, reports continuously pointed toward issues
with sustainability, most notably overarching problems with stocks over-exploitation and
depletion of stocks.42 Although other fleets (notably Chinese, Korean and Japanese) were
also fishing in Senegalese waters, the EEC/EU both held by far the largest share of the
export market and maintained the most significant local presence, thereby contributing
most to the problem.43 The agreements’ structure – payment in exchange for access –
meant that the EU could demand additional fishing opportunities in exchange for
increased financial contributions, taking advantage of any devaluation of the resource and
refusing to account for ecosystem value. Evidence for this approach could be gleaned from
EU communications on the suspension of the 2002 negotiations with Senegal to renew the
expired fisheries protocol. The official press release noted, “The European Commission
delegation felt that additional fishing possibilities would have been necessary to justify
the substantial increase in the compensation requested by the Senegalese
representatives.”44 Perhaps inadvertently, the EU showed a direct association between
payments and fishing opportunity, a position starkly inconsistent with concurrent rhetoric
from EU leaders. An entity that advanced such a claim years after the first UNCED
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conference and the FAO’s Code of Conduct could hardly hold true to its own
Environmental Commissioner’s claim that it would “play a leading role in ensuring that
Johannesburg delivers concrete progress toward sustainability goals.”45
3.3.The 2002-2006 Protocol
In early 2002, negotiations between the EU and Senegal to renew the existing
protocol came to a head. The early suspension of negotiations was influenced by pressure
from environmentalists and the Senegalese government’s position. As a result, the hiatus
marked a partial shift in the EU’s approach. The renegotiated protocol for the 2002-2006
period introduced certain principles and approaches that would later become integrated
into the 2002 CFP reform as well as into the structure of the new Fisheries Partnership
Agreements.46 Notably, the protocol’s actual provisions are prefaced by an explanatory
memorandum that places them into a context more reminiscent of concurrent
sustainability rhetoric.47 These opening paragraphs make a claim to policy continuity
through the decades (noting the “longstanding relation” in fisheries between the two
parties), although in reality the protocol represents a sharp tack from the EU’s negotiating
position only months earlier.48 In contrast to its previously guiding “payment for access”
structure, here the EU offers significant increase in its financial contribution (from 12 to
16 million EUR per year) in exchange for “considerable reduction” of fishing
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opportunity.49 The added expense could best be ascribed to concerns with sustainability—
and fair play.
The new protocol’s provisions reduce demersal quotas by 30 per cent and eliminate
coastal pelagic quotas entirely.50 They introduce continuous stock monitoring, obligatory
biological resting periods, larger mesh sizes, smaller fishing zones, reduced bycatch and
increased obligatory landing.51 In direct contradiction with the 1979 agreement, the
protocol even affords for reductions in fishing opportunity for the benefit of
conservation.52 Additionally, the protocol assigns an estimated 3 million EUR per year for
a “partnership” aiming to support scientific monitoring, institution building and artisanal
fishermen’s safety.53
These provisions are worth discussing for several reasons. First, despite language
of concern with “sustainable and responsible fisheries” (a phrase that occurs repeatedly
throughout the proposal), the 2002 protocol marks the first instance in which some of
these otherwise basic measures in fisheries conservation are introduced in a meaningful
way into the EU-Senegal fishing relations. What is more, the political context in which
they were introduced places doubt on the intentions behind these policies. As we have
seen, 2002 marked a sharp turn in the EU’s position. The EU had defended its right to
receive more fishing opportunities against larger sums early in the year; in the space of a
few months, it implemented these radically different measures, but only after the
suspension of its negotiations with Senegal. It is worth noting here that the conclusion of
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the 2002-2006 protocol, too, was followed by a hiatus in relations, this time a more lengthy
one. In short, although the measures introduced in it were more consistent with
sustainability principles than they had been previously, this was the result of some external
pressure, and clearly proved insufficient in the long term. Reviewed in this context, the
inclusion of these measures into the 2002-2006 protocol remains inconsistent with an
image of Europe as a leader in enforcing environmental principles. Instead, the presence
of these provisions in the protocol seems more aligned with a notion of Europe rather as
a shamed participant in an established system of fisheries and environmental governance.
Second, the protocol proves notable not only for its somewhat belated emphasis
on sustainability, but also for its inclusion of the ecological, but not necessarily
developmental, aspects of these principles. This was true despite official EU claims to
leadership in sustainable development, rather than just sustainable fisheries.54 The
“partnership” provisions present a sharp clash between rhetoric and reality. Originating
from the Lomé Convention as well as from the 2000 Cotonou Agreement on ACP-EU
relations, the use of the word “partnership” cannot be coincidental here as it carries notions
with it such as cooperation, developed states’ support for self-reliant development, and
awareness of developmental needs and historical issues of power in post-colonial
relations.55 The actual provisions in the protocol, however, reflect very little of these ideas.
In fact, the relevant articles ordain the establishment of a joint committee to supervise
scientific research, monitor fishing activities and stocks, oversee training of local
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fishermen for an undefined mode of “responsible fishing” (the “institutional support”
clause) and, crucially, ensure small-scale vessel safety—rather than small-scale job
security.56 Despite repeated references to “responsible” fishing, therefore, the protocol
demonstrates very limited, if any, responsibility for the social, economic, or political
impacts of EEC fishing in Senegalese waters.
Critics corroborated these conclusions.57 They also continued to highlight a
discrepancy between the EU’s rhetoric and its policy. Reports noted that, despite
expressing a commitment to eradicating poverty and advancing sustainable development
in other aspects of its international engagements, the EU fell short of implementing these
notions into its external fisheries policy.58 Analysts questioned both the EU’s motivation
and its overall ability to aid development without retaining problematic power relations
with its fishing “partners”: given uneven negotiation positions, the founding agreements
setting out trade principles as well as the bilateral fishing agreements retained power
inequality.59 And the protocol itself confirmed these concerns: although it served as a
launching point for the EU’s approach in the new generation of fishing agreements (the
FPAs), it was never renewed following its expiration in 2006. Subsequently, its
cancellation was framed as a triumph for local fishermen and Senegal more generally. 60
3.4.The 2014 Sustainable Fishing Agreement
Given the long (2006-2014) hiatus in fishing relations between the EU and Senegal
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that followed, the agreement signed in 2014 as the very first representative of the SFAs
could be expected to show significant improvements in terms of sustainable development.
Indeed, the new agreement makes large strides compared to its predecessors. To begin, it
relies much more closely on principles and tools from existing international law
instruments, citing not only UNCLOS III and the Cotonou Agreement, but also the 1995
Fish Stocks Agreement, the decisions of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and the International Labour
Organization (ILO) Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.61 In this
way, the SFA situates itself firmly within a fuller, more developed context of international
law.
Both the language and the provisions of the 2014 agreement reflect a stronger
sense of responsibility to human and developmental rights on the part of the EU. In terms
of sustainability, relevant provisions show a closer engagement with the state of the stocks.
It outlines much fewer fishing opportunities for EU vessels in Senegalese waters,
accounting for the limitations of the fishing resources.62 Unlike in the original agreement
or the 2002 negotiations, moreover, the 2014 agreement allows for adjustment of financial
contribution or of fishing opportunity as necessitated by conservation, and, notably, as
determined through joint EU-Senegal deliberation.63 The new agreement includes
provisions for cooperation and consultation between professional fishing organizations,
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the private sector and the Senegalese society, thus allowing representation of different
interests.64 This approach speaks more directly to the tone of past UNCED conferences
and their emphasis on cooperation and equitable participation in promoting soft law
principles. In short, overall the provisions of the 2014 SFA seem better aligned with the
role of normative influence suggested by the international law framework.
However, there are criticisms that remain unaddressed. The agreement does not
include special considerations for small-scale fishermen, nor does it address issues of
competition between EU-subsidized vessels and local artisanal fleets. Articles concerning
the institutional support, albeit strengthened through the creation of a private-public
stakeholder forum, still only offer limited help for self-sufficient development. And
fundamental issues for Senegal, such as protein dependence, employment and food
security, fall entirely outside the purview of the agreement—whereas their inclusion could
both benefit Senegal (especially given the strength of the EU’s seafood market) and
demonstrate the EU’s commitment to advancing human rights goals and showcase its
leadership in sustainable fisheries governance. Given these weaknesses, the following
chapter will discuss recommendations for future protocols and amendments to the 2014
SFA.
4. Discussion
The analysis of EU-Senegal bilateral fishing agreements over time shows that EU
rhetoric has tended to overstate and by far outstrip any positive action in implementing
sustainability or developmental principles. Due to its two-level dynamic, EU policy in
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Senegal has proved reluctant and slow in adopting notions from the international law
framework even as its stated aspirations have become more and more elaborate. Relevant
documents reveal a discrepancy between EU rhetoric and the actual policy implemented.
Additionally, policies advanced through the EU-Senegalese bilateral agreements have
tended to reflect the shortcomings of international treaties and agreements as opposed to
their aspirations or positive contributions.
Although the 1979 agreement precedes much of the relevant international law
framework on fisheries, it nevertheless exemplifies one of these trends. The bilateral
agreement exhibits concrete issues from the international law it cites (the 1975 Lomé
Convention and UNCLOS III), while it does not necessarily implement the law’s
progressive suggestions. For instance, the bilateral fishing agreement reflects not so much
the Lomé Convention’s “spirit of cooperation” (that is, its aspiration of promoting
equitable trade in post-colonial relations) as the Convention’s tendency to promote market
dependency. Although Senegalese fishing exports to the EEC/EU increased substantially
as a result of the agreement, the Senegalese fishing industry overall did not necessarily
benefit from it: given the large percentage of small-scale vessels, the Senegalese exports
often had to rely on EU operators. Similarly, in adopting the complementarity principle
outlined in UNCLOS III, the agreement has promoted conflict and over-exploitation rather
than conservation and cooperation. In short, the 1979 agreement proved unsuccessful at
showing itself as a promoter of international law aspirations.
Proponents of the EU’s normative power perspective might point out that the 1979
agreement precedes the EEC/EU’s legal centralization in the 1980s-1990s, thereby
predating the EU’s ability and motivation to promote international law principles.
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However, protocol and letters over the 1979-2002 period, as discussed above, demonstrate
similar limitations as the original agreement. Moreover, as the agreement was never
amended in this period, the EU’s changing legal structure in the 1980s and 1990s showed
little direct impact on the EU-Senegalese fishing relations over the same period. Key
advancements of international fisheries governance, such as the FAO’s 1995 Code of
Conduct and the UN’s 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, were not incorporated into the EUSenegalese agreement at that point. And finally, the discourse analysis above illustrates a
jarring contrast between EU rhetoric on leadership in sustainable development (e.g.,
Wallström, 2002) and concurrent fishing negotiations with Senegal, in which the EU
sought fishing access against payment with little regard to the sustainability of stock
levels. Hence, there is stronger evidence for the hypothesis of EU fishing as motivated
predominantly by internal political needs.
Further, while the renegotiated 2002 protocol does implement specific principles
of sustainable development, it does so both belatedly and incompletely. To begin with, the
EU’s inclusion of certain conservation aspects into the protocol contrasts sharply with its
negotiating position only months earlier. This discrepancy again suggests that political
pressure, rather than an internal normative purpose, impacted the EU’s decision. A
plausible analysis supports the alternative narrative for EU fishing: a combination of
Senegal’s own position in insisting on sustainable stock levels and of internal EU interests
to maintain Spanish vessels’ access to foreign waters. Thereby, the sudden 2002 inclusion
of sustainability and stock considerations – years after the 1992 Rio Conference, 1995
Code of Conduct and 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement – reveals the EU as a reluctant
participant in the international fishing management framework. Instead, its policies seem
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motivated by internal concessions and two-level politics.
Such a conclusion makes it less surprising that the 2002 protocol includes
developmental and equitable trade provisions in a very limited manner compared to the
breadth of understanding in UNCED conferences and the FAO Code of Conduct. A
normative power EU would be expected to include, in both its negotiations and protocol,
provisions that proactively support equitable trade, food security, and poverty eradication.
Such policies would have to incorporate measures for enhancing Senegal’s market
independence or discussions of the socio-economic impacts of tariffs and exports; they
would have to consider advanced support for small-scale fisheries, including measures on
enhancing their competitiveness with EU fleets; and they would need to put in place
institutional capacity building independently from the financial arrangements for fishing
access.
The 2002 protocol comes short of implementing or even aspiring to such measures.
Provisions on small-scale fishermen, for example, hold very little prominence in the
protocol, as they were not present in the CFP political agenda at the time, and are hence
limited to “safety” considerations. By contrast, the subsidized access fee and similar
elements of the unchanged 1979-2002 agreement represent ongoing support for
maintaining EU vessels’ competitiveness abroad. Similarly, the 2002 protocol introduces
payments for “capacity building” that remain tied to access fees in a manner more
consistent with supporting EU market dependence than local self-governance. In short,
despite its concessions to certain principles of international law, the 2002 protocol hardly
represents the EU’s normative power ambitions advanced at the same time by its leaders.
Instead, its policies seem more consistent with an ongoing mission to appease internal
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interests.
These observations are confirmed by the eight-year long hiatus in EU-Senegal
fishing relations after the protocol’s 2006 expiration. As discussed earlier, the
discontinuation was positively viewed by local small-scale fishermen. It must further be
noted that, given the EU’s significant financial contribution to Senegal under the 20022006 protocol, the Senegalese government’s refusal to renew the agreement
communicates important political concerns with its structure and implementation. Based
on Senegal’s position during the 2002 negotiations, it is possible to speculate with some
certainty that the reasons for the cancellation were strongly related to issues with
sustainability and local development. The hiatus suggests a perspective on EU fishing in
Senegal that is consistent with the narrative of exporting overfishing as opposed to
supporting local development.
Finally, while it is too early to determine the policy outcome of the 2014
agreement, it is possible to make a few guiding observations. First, it must be noted that
the new agreement reflects increased commitment to a more UNCED-coherent style of
development support: that is, one that is cooperative, participatory, and focused on soft
law. As these are elements vital to the sustainable development pantheon of principles,
their emphasis in the 2014 SFA is a step in the right direction.
Still, the agreement’s provisions do not entirely match the EU’s rhetorical
aspirations.

Although the new agreement demonstrates increased concern with

maintaining stocks at sustainable levels and cooperative governance between both parties,
it still falls short of certain developmental targets. For instance, although negotiated
concurrently with the FAO’s SSF Guidelines, the SFA does not incorporate nearly enough
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provisions on the sustenance and job security of small-scale fishermen. Since the SFA is
a hard law document, unlike the SSF Guidelines, its inclusion of these principles would
truly represent a commitment to propagating them internationally. A normative power
perspective might be strengthened by additional provisions on limiting subsidies to EU
vessel owners and otherwise maintaining conditions for equitable competition between
small-scale and industrial fishermen. In addition, the debate on market dependence and
food security in the face of climbing exports is still missing from the SFA discussions.
The missing provisions on subsidies and tariffs seem to be a continuing
manifestation of the EU’s internal political goals. The new agreement stands to maintain
EU vessel owners, especially Spanish ones, as its chief beneficiaries. Thus the strong
lobby of Spanish and other external fishing interests continues to exert a clear influence
on the outcomes of fishing policy. If the EU is truly committed to enhancing its partner
country’s independent development, it must find a way to overcome or align these internal
goals with its normative aspirations. To do so, the EU could utilize market and subsidiary
measures, among other tools. The following and final chapter elaborates upon these
recommendations, discussing concrete policies in support of the EU’s normative power
perspective in the context of the international law framework, and draws conclusions
about the EU’s future involvement in fishing policy.
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations
Insights from the Senegal case study show that the EU’s bilateral agreements still
reflect internal political goals more closely than claims of promoting international norms.
Progress in implementing principles from the international law framework has lagged
behind important developments in sustainable and responsible fishing (from the UNCED
conferences, the FAO’s 1995 Code of Conduct and the 2014 SSF Guidelines), even as EU
rhetoric, particularly originating from representatives of the European Commission, has
included recurring statements of leadership in global environmental and sustainable
fishing governance. Overall, EU fishing policies in Senegal have reflected shortcomings
of international law, whereas they have been less successful at incorporating its
advancements.
This deficiency can be perceived strongly in the context of human rights and
development. The EU-Senegalese fishing relations reflect a broader global trend in that,
although some progress toward cooperative governance has been made over time, the
fishing agreements themselves remain weak tools for advancing sustainable development
and human rights. As the Senegal case demonstrates, measures that were designed as tools
toward equitable cooperation have instead contributed to curbing food security,
undermining the competitiveness of the local fishing sector, and hindering rather than
aiding the country’s developmental goals. For instance, the non-reciprocal export tariff
exemptions outlined under the EU-ACP Lomé Convention and reflected in the EU’s
bilateral agreements helped achieve a marked increase in Senegalese fish exports and
resulting revenue for the state. However, the tariff regime established the EU market as
the predominant destination for these exports, thereby creating a market dependency. In
66

turn, this has raised concerns with conflicts between export-oriented fishing and food
security in Senegal, where seafood products constitute a large percentage of the
population’s main protein intake. Similarly, the dual payment scheme in the FPA/SFAs
was meant to support local capacity-building on a cooperative basis; yet its coupling of
access fee and sectoral aid in effect has made such support contingent on EU fleet access
to local waters, with some problematic implications. First, this contingency propagates
power imbalance in EU-Senegalese negotiations, undermining the sectoral payment’s
stated purpose. Second, the underlying assumption that development support for the
fishing sector would only be extended when fishing access is available could potentially
incite discord between the recipient country’s human rights and stock sustainability
priorities.
These observations raise questions about the ability of trade-based relations in
post-colonial contexts to overcome the inequalities already ingrained in the international
system. At the same time, recurring rhetoric of cooperation and colonialism on both sides
of the debate surrounding the EU-ACP fishing agreements highlights just how important
issues of development and human rights remain as a normative convergence point in trade
relations, despite the inherent challenges. This chapter discusses these issues at some
greater length.
In addition, the chapter addresses in more depth the political and structural
complexities of the EU’s role in this dynamic. Besides highlighting the failures of trade as
a developmental tool, the Senegal case study also demonstrates the contradictions between
different external fishing goals within the EU itself. Both rhetoric and some of the
improved provisions in later protocols and the 2014 SFA agreement indicate that the
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normative purpose is not irrelevant to the EU’s agenda. At the same time, policy
supporting the bilateral agreements, such as the subsidies schemes and tariff regimes,
continue to serve the internal goals of maintaining EU (especially Spanish) fleets
competitive and of promoting the EU market as a desirable export destination for catch
made in Senegalese waters. While previous chapters have discussed the origins of this
contradiction to some extent, it must be noted here that this work has presented a
simplified picture of internal EU dynamics. In reality, the political interactions between
different EU institutions, notably the European Commission, European Council, and
European Parliament, combined with the varying influence of member states’ interests,
account for an additional layer of complexity in achieving goal coherence internally and
projecting it to the external dimension of the CFP. This chapter aims to address some of
these dynamics.
Exploring these two themes, the chapter also fields some tentative
recommendations for future EU policy. These recommendations are made in effort to
support the advancement of the EU’s normative perspective in concert with human rights
principles in international fisheries management. However, noting the inherent difficulties
with the EU’s stated objectives, this chapter also elaborates upon the complexities of
development and international involvement and, accordingly, draws broader implications
and conclusions from the present study.
1. Discussion and Policy Recommendations
1.1. EU Institutions, Spain, and Subsidies
While this work has highlighted only some of the dynamics behind the CFP and
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its external dimension, the actual political reality is much more complex. Initially drafted
by the European Commission (which represents the interests of the EU as a whole), EU
legislation must be jointly approved by the Council of Minsters (which consists of the
heads of state of EU member states and therefore represents closely member states’
interests) and the European Parliament (which is directly elected by nationals of member
states and holds, after the 2007 Lisbon Treaty, a much larger prominence in the decisionmaking process).1 At each of these institutions, the interests of member states and substate groups may manifest differently. Legally, the Commission is obliged to seek opinions
from national parliaments, while politically, its role as the drafting institution means that
it must a priori accommodate at least in part the interests of the other institutions. The
Council of Ministers invariably represents the national interests of member states. In the
European Parliament, influence can manifest differently depending on representative
distribution in the Parliament as a whole and specifically in individual sub-committees
tasked to review legislation.2
The complexity of this legislative procedure allows for the interests of individual
member states to play out at the institutional level. The stakes for this are particularly high
with the CFP, which is a highly contested and lobbied policy. Arguably the strongest
source of influence on the CFP’s external dimension is that of the Spanish long distance
fishing industry, exercised both through representation of the Spanish government in the
Council of Ministers and through less formal paths of influence, such as individual groups’

1

European Commission. 2014. The European Union explained: How the EU works. Luxembourg:
Publications Office of the European Union.
2
Id.

69

lobbying.3 For Spain, fishing presents an enormous economic interest: several regions in
Spain, including Galicia, Andalusia, and El Hierro in the Canary Islands, are highly
dependent on fishing; and in a country where national unemployment averaged 24.63 per
cent in 2012 at the height of the financial crisis, the fishing industry retains a remarkably
low unemployment rate of 7.2 per cent.4 Hence, the notable sway of the Spanish fishing
lobby in the European Parliament and especially in the Council of Ministers is grounded
in significant local and national economic interests; but it also raises a conceptual
difficulty: in the light of the financial crisis and its disproportionate effects on Spain,
decisions that would negatively affect the Spanish long distance fishing industry are
harder to justify politically or implement.

Figure 3: The fishing lobby's sway in the EU.5
Because of this, policies that have undermined the EU’s normative goals in the
past but nevertheless ensure the economic viability of the fishing industry, such as the EU
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fishing subsidies, become much harder to dismiss. As discussed in previous chapters,
fishing subsidies in the EU predominantly benefit Spanish fishing boat owners.6 The
policy has faced criticism from multiple sources for its export of Spanish fishing capacity
to third countries’ waters and for giving the Spanish long distance fleet a competitive
advantage against local fleets, especially through encouraging fishing activities at low
stock levels.7 In short, the subsidy regime is starkly inconsistent with the European
Commission’s rhetoric of promoting norms of sustainability, responsible fishing and
equitable development. Enacting change through limiting the subsidy regime would
therefore produce significant long-term effects for the EU’s partner states, especially
through decreasing pressure on local resources and making small-scale fishing
communities more competitive than they are now, given pressure from subsidized Spanish
vessels.
Yet doing so would carry huge political costs for the EU. In view of the financial
crisis, ongoing debates on austerity, and rising euro-skepticism, the fishing subsidies have
a significant impact not only on development and sustainability but also on unemployment
and right to work, aspects of human rights that are applicable in Spain just as in Senegal.
Hence, reform of the fishing subsidies, at least in the short term, could provoke questions
of intra-EU justice and human rights even if it would help reinforce the Commission’s
vision of a normative power Europe.
In the long term, political will for addressing this issue is more consistent with the

V. M. Kaczynski and D. L. Fluharty, “European policies in West Africa: Who benefits from fisheries
agreements?” Marine Policy 26 (2002): 75-93.
7
B. Gorez, “Policy study: EU-ACP fisheries agreements.” Report, UK Department for International
Development (2005); UNEP. 2002. Integrated Assessment of Trade Liberalization and Trade-Related
Policies: A Country Study on the Fisheries Sector in Senegal; O. Brown, “Policy incoherence: EU
fisheries policy in Senegal.” UNDP Human Development Report (2005).
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EU’s normative international goals and could emerge from the European Parliament,
which advocates citizens’ perspective. Increasingly influential following the 2007 Lisbon
Treaty, the Parliament has become a much more prominent voice in EU governance.
Whereas in the past European Parliament elections have suffered from low turnout and
prompted questions of a democratic deficit in the EU, studies show a relative increase in
the visibility of European policy in national debates and media over the last few years.8
Furthermore, while the European Parliament elections have predominantly served as a
venue for expressing discontent with national politics in the past, the 2014 election more
closely reflected citizens’ European outlook, even if for the most part this was expressed
through euro-skepticism. Additionally, at this point it is unclear whether the increasing
influence of the European Parliament will weigh on fisheries policy more heavily toward
a protectionist EU employment direction, or a normative, international human rights
perspective. In short, the European Parliament today remains an imperfect tool for
institutionalizing citizens’ normative beliefs, but there are indicators to suggest that this
might change in coming years. Provided that the European Parliament could indeed come
to represent the cultural and European values of its citizens more closely in the future, it
could also constitute a stronger voice for policy coherence in the EU, and in the CFP. It is
not to be taken for granted, however, that this voice will necessarily advocate the
normative perspective.
1.2.Trade Measures for Human Rights and Sustainability
Analysis of the EU’s bilateral fishing agreements in previous chapters has

8

S.B. Hobolt, “A vote for the President? The role of Spitzenkandidaten in the 2014 European Parliament
elections,” Journal of European Public Policy 21 (2014): 1528-1540.
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highlighted concern with political will in the EU for supporting the human rights and
sustainability needs of its fishing partner states. An important aspect of these relations is
the impact of trade policies: the draw of the EU export market, the EU-ACP tariff regimes,
concern with equal standing in trade negotiations, and the effect of EU subsidies on local
fleets’ competitiveness. Despite the relevance of these issues, and although the CFP itself
controls both the EU’s fishing efforts and its markets, trade-based policies have so far been
absent from either the CFP’s external dimension or the debates on ensuring coherence
with developmental goals.
Yet the strength of the EU as the world’s foremost market for seafood products
makes it particularly well-positioned to address normative aspirations such as food
security, poverty eradication, and sustainability through trade measures. In other aspects
of fishing policy, most notably combating illegal, unregulated, and underreported (IUU)
fishing, the EU has already shown initiative to utilize its market influence.9 In the context
of development, as noted above, trade measures have been less successful. Introducing
trade more prominently as part of the conversation about the bilateral fishing agreements
may help support developmental goals such as food security, poverty eradication, stock
sustainability, and maintaining small-scale fishing communities. More specifically, the
European Commission must consider addressing the effects of its tariff regime on partner
countries’ food security and market dependency; and it must amend its sectoral support
measures to better support small-scale fisheries.
As discussed earlier, the EU-ACP tariff regime has proved more problematic than

9

See Council of the European Union. 2008. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008 establishing a
Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing. Official
Journal of the European Union, L286/1.

73

initially conceptualized. In 2009, 98 per cent of exports to the EU from ACP countries,
including fishing exports, entered the EU duty and tariff free.10 Yet this non-reciprocal
tariff exemptions regime, outlined under the 2000 Cotonou Agreement and valid until
2020, ensures ACP partner countries’ dependence on the EU market as an export
destination – and on export itself as a valuable source of revenue.11 For many of these
countries, local food security depends on fish products, which then presents a conflict with
rising economic incentives for export. In this project, this general trend has been illustrated
by the Senegal case study, where 75 per cent of the population relies on fish products for
their main protein intake, yet conditions established by the Lomé and Cotonou
Agreements have made fish the country’s highest export by both volume and value.12 For
Senegal and countries like it, such conflicting incentives could spell significant issues with
food security in the future.
In addition, the financial incentive to export is coupled for Senegal and other ACP
countries with an equally strong incentive to conduct bilateral access agreements with the
EU, both because of the access right and “sectoral support” revenue, and because often
these countries’ own fleets, consisting predominantly of small-scale vessels, cannot access
the EU market as easily. This raises concerns with ecosystem health as well as food
security. Developing countries that rely on fish exports for revenue face significant
pressure to continue fishing even when stock levels are at unsustainable levels. This

Delegation of the European Union to Sierra Leone. 2015. “Trade.” Available online:
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dependency prevents the host country from utilizing the resource in a manner that would
be best for the local industry or the communities dependent on the resource.
And finally, all of this is premised on the assumption that stock surplus is
constantly available to be fished or exported in ACP waters. Hence, there is a multi-level
power imbalance in EU-ACP fishing negotiations, both for trade agreements and for
access agreements. Developing countries must often approach fishing negotiations with
the EU only through an internal compromise between curbing local food security, harming
the sustainability of the local ecosystem, introducing significant competition for local
fishermen, and gaining revenue in exchange for exports, access, or development support
to the fishing sector. Needless to say, the EU does not face similar levels of uncertainty
with the agreements. Thus, the negotiations often contain a distinct power imbalance.
The debate about these issues is entirely absent from current discourse at the EU
institutional level. Any meaningful dialogue about these problems must include partner
states, and it must begin with an overview of the tariff regime and the structure of the dual
payments for bilateral fishing agreements. First, the EU must consider tailoring the tariff
regime in respect to all fishing access and trade agreements as a means of remedying the
regime’s intended purpose of supporting development. In a manner similar to the EU’s
approach with IUU fishing, the purchasing power of the EU’s market could be utilized to
encourage seafood products that are more sustainable than others. More specifically, in
consultation with partner states, tariff-free status could target only catch that is not vital
for these countries’ food security. Species that serve as the main source of protein to these
countries’ citizens, on the other hand, could be removed from the tariff-exempt list, with
tariffs imposed proportionally to their importance to the local communities. It is vital,
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however, that these measures be devised in close consultation with partner states, to reflect
their needs most closely.
As part of its trade considerations, the EU should also implement policies in
support of small-scale fishing communities. The previous chapter has already noted the
paucity of such measures in the EU-Senegal fishing agreements. Where relevant
provisions were adopted, they dealt with the “safety” of artisanal fishermen as opposed to
with concerns for employment and sustenance.13 Additionally, the 2014 EU-Senegal SFA
has failed to incorporate a substantial amount of provisions from the FAO’s SSF
Guidelines, even though both agreements were negotiated at the same time, and with the
involvement of both parties. While there is not necessarily a direct link between the two
international tools, implementing measures from the soft law SSF Guidelines would have
supported the vision of the EU as a normative actor. Instead, the debate on small-scale
fishermen and their relationship to the EU’s fishing policies is limited. In key documents
on the 2014 CFP reform, artisanal fisheries are either entirely absent, or are present only
as an afterthought.14
Trade measures for supporting these communities could be integrated into the EU’s
existing capacity building payments. Currently, these payments are geared mainly toward
supporting scientific knowledge, data collection and management;15 but equally, they

13

See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the conclusion of the Protocol setting out the fishing
opportunities and the financial contribution provided by the Agreement between the European
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could be utilized for community-focused development. The FAO’s SSF Guidelines point
to “poor access to health, education and other social services” as a pertinent challenge
faced by small-scale fishing communities.16 The EU could fruitfully address these issues
through its sectoral payments.
More broadly, the EU needs to decouple such payments from its fishing access
fees.17 The current structure introduces a conditionality to capacity building in the sector,
which cuts against the advancement of human rights or developmental goals in partner
countries’ fishing sectors. Although proposals for decoupling sectoral from access
payments were featured during discussions on the CFP’s most recent reform, the final
structure of the agreements does not implement this policy. 18 The dual payment scheme
thus leads to incoherence with past agreements on sustainable development, such as the
UNCED conferences and FAO soft law instruments. These fora have emphasized the need
to promote development without conditionality or prescription, in contrast to making
capacity building conditional on fishing access.
Moreover, the pairing of fishing access and sectoral support payments is noncompliant with broader trends in modern international law, including global trade
aspirations. Above all, the EU’s current payments scheme clashes with the direction of
negotiations on fishing subsidies advanced by the WTO. Critics, WTO officials and other

Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on the Regions on
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countries (among which the US, Norway, Australia, New Zealand) have long advocated
for limiting subsidies that contribute to overcapacity.19 By contrast, the EU has a long
history of rejecting such proposals and of arguing that its policies should not be considered
as subsidies.20 Yet the EU’s dual payment scheme falls under this category because the
access fee is mainly paid by the EU, rather than by vessel owners. More importantly, the
fees system is particularly problematic in the dialogue on subsidies and sustainability
because it makes developmental and institutional support for the fishing sector contingent
on fishing access. In this way, measures that are presented as supportive of sustainability
goals serve in practice as a Trojan horse for overexploitation.
Decoupling the access fee and capacity building payments can bring the EU closer
to a normative role. Because of its significant sway as the world’s foremost market for
seafood products, the EU would lose relatively little from implementing measures that
support decreased dependency and food security in ACP countries. It is likely to retain
both its influence and its competitiveness as the world’s largest purchasing power for
seafood products despite changes in the tariff scheme or dual payments. By contrast, the
EU would gain much in the way of respectability as an international actor and a champion
of human rights in fisheries. Its market-based support for curbing IUU fishing is already
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looked to as a global best practice.21 Its implementation of similar, and stronger, measures
in the development context could accomplish the same.
2. Broader Implications
2.1. The EU’s Structural Limitations to International Involvement
Considerable political will is necessary to advance the Commission’s normative
perspective. However, as noted above, at this time there is a limited amount of political
will for advancing developmental goals, whereas there is a strong set of interests in favor
of internal economic interests. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the EU’s underlying
institutional structure continues to change, and is not always in a line consistent with
normative goals. This chapter has already addressed some of the uncertainty involved in
determining the European Parliament’s increasing influence and its likely direction. In
fisheries, institutional change can also be observed with the newly established joint
Commission for Environment, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries.22
The new Commission signals realignment for environmental and ocean policy
objectives. On one hand, the fusion of previously separate Commissions grants the
Commissioner (Karmenu Vella) more political power; it also constitutes a non-rhetorical
action toward managing natural resources systematically, potentially in concert with
principles of ecosystem-based management. On the other hand, language from PresidentElect Juncker’s mission letter to Mr. Vella suggests a much stronger emphasis on “Green
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Growth” and “Blue Growth” (environment and ocean related jobs and investments).23 This
orientation could prove more akin to the interests of the Spanish fishing lobby to maintain
fleet and seafood market competitiveness. At only half a year after the new Commission’s
establishment, predictions would be immature; however, overall the new institutional
arrangement does not seem intended to advance developmental or human rights in the
external aspect of the CFP. Instead, the mission letter communicates goals of targeting
sustainable development as a means to economic growth within the EU.
Once again, this raises questions about the future of political will for foreign
development, sustainability and human rights in the EU. Examining the CFP’s external
fishing goals has shown consistent conflicts between objectives. This tendency has not
been limited to foreign fishing only: the length of the last CFP reform negotiations (20092013) suggests the inevitable political compromises ingrained into the policy. Objectives
generated at different levels of governance (supranational versus national) and within
different groups at each level (e.g., between EU institutions such as the Council versus the
Commission, or between member states, North versus South) have consistently driven
these difficulties. As demonstrated throughout this work, these internal contradictions
impact the EU’s external fishing policy significantly. But more importantly, these issues
impact many other aspects of EU politics, as well – including, at this time, financial policy
and external politics.24 Hence, the questions raised here about the EU’s mode of
participation in the international regime not only remain open, but are ones that deserve
due attention from any future research interested in the EU’s global influence.
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2.2. EU-ACP and International Power Relations
If the EU’s mode of international involvement is in question, so, too, is its
relationship with developing countries. In international law, developmental principles are
usually advanced through soft law mechanisms of cooperation and multilateralism. This
approach is crucial for avoiding the prescription inherent to power relations. Yet the
approach is also vulnerable to issues with enforceability. The advancement of soft law
principles depends heavily on good political will, but also on an entity’s ability to carry
out its positive intentions through relevant policy. However, as the bilateral fishing case
in this work illustrates, policies intended to promote cooperation can often have the
opposite effect. While imperfect, the EU could be argued to enact its policies with
relatively more transparency and pro-developmental dialogue than other long distance
fishing powers. Even so, its internal inconsistencies and political interests deter it from
making as full a positive impact as claimed or intended.
This suggests larger implications about the inherent issues of developmental
policies. They must be inclusive but cannot be necessarily equal; they must utilize aid and
support originating from developed countries but avoid prescription. These are difficult
challenges, and the right approach to meeting them is not necessarily clear. This issue is
additionally complicated by the nature of the international system, in which political
influence pans out differently in global treaty negotiations and in bilateral relations.
Hence, the overview of fishing policy here raises much larger, and much more difficult,
questions about power dynamics in the international system and the ability of concrete
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policies to address them.25
2.3. International Law and International Policy
Finally, this study raises questions about what gets lost in translation when
aspirations placed in international law are translated into concrete policy. This is a
particularly challenging query when the issues concerned are as comprehensive and
multifaceted as the ones discussed here: human rights, equitable development, natural
resource use and the environment. The abstractions of these issues call for broader
provisions at the international level. Hence, whereas the UNCLOS III negotiations created
– albeit in the space of nine years – in a codified hard law regime governing ocean space,
the UNCED conferences, in three installments covering twenty years, have produced
predominantly soft law mechanisms. In the context of fisheries, this has resulted in
divergent policies, compliant with hard law under UNCLOS III but not necessarily with
soft law principles advanced by the FAO’s Code of Conduct and SSF Guidelines.
Policies also have difficulty reflecting the aspirations of international law because,
while the language of the law can at times afford to be broad (e.g., “eradicating poverty”),
policies must, by contrast, be operational. Thus, when international law’s aspirations are
synthesized into policy objectives, too often certain nuances are lost in the translation.
These are observations without an easy answer. At the same time, however, they are ones
that deserve much more attention. Future research might therefore address approaches to
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the deficiency in translations between international law and international policy.
3. Conclusion
While many of the large questions involved in this study remain unanswered, and
some of the broader themes it suggests remain unexplored, nevertheless several useful
conclusions could be made here.
First, the plethora of norms referenced by rhetoric from the European Commission
on international fishing governance draws on a rich history of ideas about human rights
and the environment that were first advocated by developing countries. This, in itself,
problematizes the Commission’s claim of normative influence in fisheries. However,
while over time the Commission’s rhetoric has come much closer to framing these ideas
correctly in a context of international cooperation for development and sustainability, in
practice the policies of the EU remain under a strong influence from internal political
interests, largely advanced by the Spanish long distance lobby. The discrepancies in the
EU’s claims and actions are hence manifestations of its institutional composition and its
lack of uniform legitimacy among its citizens. In the wake of a financial crisis, it has come
to seem that political will for advancing human rights and sustainability in partner states’
waters is currently deficient in the EU. These findings have been illustrated through a case
study of bilateral agreements between the EU and Senegal over time.
In a broader sense, in seeking to understand the inconsistency between EU rhetoric
and EU policy, these chapters have described an entity still struggling with its internal
incoherence despite its enhanced legal centralization. At the same time, the EU’s policies
also reflect the incoherence of the international law framework itself. In particular, they
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reflect the difficulties of aiding development without prescribing policy and of exploiting
marine resources without depleting them. In short, the broader questions raised by this
work are also questions that apply back to the EU’s fishing policy in the future. Fair fishing
is hardly a county fair.
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